diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 2c7debdd..f46aab2d 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -180,3 +180,5 @@ ref/ # pddlstream writes its FastDownward scratch files into the working directory. temp/ statistics/ + +.apptainer-env-cache/ diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 6919b288..e0a46f05 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ python experiments/run_experiment.py approach=agentic \ replicate_seed=0 eval_seed="$EVAL_SEED" ``` -With login-file authentication, Docker and Apptainer copy only `auth.json` into a throwaway Codex home. Host `config.toml`, `AGENTS.md`, skills, and session history are not mounted. Each fresh experiment starts with an empty sandbox-local session directory; only an automatic retry of that same experiment can resume it. +With login-file authentication, Docker copies only `auth.json` into a throwaway Codex home. Apptainer keeps authentication on the host in its inference broker and mounts no real credentials. Neither mounts host `config.toml`, `AGENTS.md`, skills, or session history. Each fresh experiment starts with an empty sandbox-local session directory; only an automatic retry of that same experiment can resume it. #### OpenCode (multi-provider) @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ The agent runs inside a Docker container (`robocode-sandbox`) that provides full | Network | `init-firewall.sh` whitelists API endpoints for the configured provider (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, etc.), GitHub IPs, and telemetry; blocks everything else via iptables. Extra domains are passed via `ROBOCODE_FIREWALL_EXTRA_DOMAINS`. | | Write hook | Claude backend: `PreToolUse` hook in `.claude/settings.json` double-checks Write/Edit paths stay inside `/sandbox`. Codex and OpenCode rely on the enclosing Docker filesystem boundary. | -The Apptainer backend (`container_backend=apptainer`, for HPC clusters with no Docker daemon) keeps the same filesystem isolation but has **no network firewall**: unprivileged Apptainer cannot grant `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, so `init-firewall.sh` is skipped and generated code runs with unrestricted network egress. Use Docker where the iptables allowlist matters. +The Apptainer backend (`container_backend=apptainer`, for HPC clusters without Docker) now runs Codex and Claude in a disconnected network namespace (`--userns --net --network none`). A host broker permits validated model inference, and a separate relay reaches only the experiment environment server. Agent processes cannot use general internet access, and provider credentials stay outside the container. See [setup and isolation boundaries](docs/apptainer-network-isolation.md). Unsupported Apptainer backends and GenPlan fail closed. ### What the agent sees diff --git a/docker/entrypoint.sh b/docker/entrypoint.sh index c2288bd4..752bc3c4 100644 --- a/docker/entrypoint.sh +++ b/docker/entrypoint.sh @@ -30,13 +30,13 @@ if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then HOME=/home/node USER=node LOGNAME=node \ "${run_as_node[@]}" uv sync --frozen --python python3.11 "${uv_extra_args[@]}" else - # Unprivileged Apptainer runs preserve the host UID. + # Preserve non-root invocation behavior when firewall setup is explicitly skipped. uv sync --frozen --python python3.11 "${uv_extra_args[@]}" fi cd /sandbox -# Skipped under unprivileged Apptainer, which cannot grant CAP_NET_ADMIN; -# ROBOCODE_SKIP_FIREWALL=1 is set by apptainer_sandbox.py. +# Docker firewall setup. Preserve the existing explicit skip override. +# Apptainer does not invoke this entrypoint; it uses a disconnected namespace. if [ "${ROBOCODE_SKIP_FIREWALL:-0}" = "1" ]; then echo "entrypoint: ROBOCODE_SKIP_FIREWALL=1, skipping firewall init" >&2 else diff --git a/docker/strict-blackbox-entrypoint.sh b/docker/strict-blackbox-entrypoint.sh index d5d4af5f..635dbbf2 100644 --- a/docker/strict-blackbox-entrypoint.sh +++ b/docker/strict-blackbox-entrypoint.sh @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ set -euo pipefail IFS=$'\n\t' -# Skipped under unprivileged Apptainer, which cannot grant CAP_NET_ADMIN; -# ROBOCODE_SKIP_FIREWALL=1 is set by apptainer_sandbox.py. +# Docker firewall setup. Preserve the existing explicit skip override. +# Apptainer does not invoke this entrypoint; it uses a disconnected namespace. if [ "${ROBOCODE_SKIP_FIREWALL:-0}" = "1" ]; then echo "entrypoint: ROBOCODE_SKIP_FIREWALL=1, skipping firewall init" >&2 else @@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then -- "$@" fi -# Unprivileged Apptainer runs preserve the host UID. +# Preserve non-root invocation behavior when firewall setup is explicitly skipped. exec "$@" diff --git a/docs/apptainer-network-isolation.md b/docs/apptainer-network-isolation.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9afbd31f --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/apptainer-network-isolation.md @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +# Apptainer agent isolation + +The Apptainer backend runs Codex and Claude in a disconnected network namespace. +It requires an installation that permits unprivileged user/network namespaces and +`--network none`. The launcher checks isolation before starting the agent and +aborts if the required boundary cannot be established. + +## Setup + +Build the image used by your experiment: + +```sh +bash docker/build_sif.sh +# For strict blackbox experiments: +bash docker/build_strict_blackbox_sif.sh +``` + +Configure `approach.container_backend=apptainer` and authenticate the selected +backend on the host. Credentials must be valid when a run starts; refresh/login +happens on the host. OpenCode, custom model endpoints, and the separate +GenPlan/Best-of-K Apptainer path are unsupported and fail closed. + +Use an updated launcher and rebuild strict images when their Dockerfile or copied +render sources change. Updating only the image does not update launcher code in +another checkout. The launcher rejects the legacy strict MCP environment. + +## Permitted connections + +The agent has only loopback networking. Two mounted Unix sockets provide the +connections needed for experiments: + +- The **model broker** holds real credentials on the host and forwards validated + inference requests to fixed provider endpoints. It rejects arbitrary destinations, + CONNECT, redirects, hosted web/MCP tools, remote content references, and unsupported + operations. Client-side tool definitions and inline raster images are supported. + Logs contain endpoint/status/rejection information, not request bodies or tokens. +- The **environment relay** reaches one host port selected by trusted launcher + configuration (`env_server_port`). It supports the existing reset/step/render + protocol. Agent-writable `env_spaces.json` cannot select a new host destination. + +Inference is an intentional external connection. Agents can submit permitted +inference requests themselves; the broker is not a spending or rate-limit boundary. + +## Runtime boundaries + +The supervisor requires a non-root UID, loopback-only interfaces, no IPv4 routes, +zero capabilities, and no-new-privileges. Filesystem/PID isolation and a clean +process environment prevent default host-home mounts and inherited credentials. +There is no fallback to host networking. + +Regular dependencies are installed in a trusted preparation phase with network +access, before agent execution and without agent files, sessions, or credentials. +The completed environment is mounted read-only. Runtime offline environment +variables supplement the network namespace; they do not enforce isolation alone. + +Strict images contain stdlib, NumPy/SciPy, and generic protocol helpers, without +project or MCP framework packages. Both MCP render tools use the strict interpreter; +agent-written policies execute inside the container. A separate virtualenv would +not stop agents from importing its readable packages via another `sys.path`. +Filtered source mounts also exclude compiled bytecode for withheld modules. + +The trusted host, kernel, Apptainer, broker, dependency preparation, and environment +server remain part of the boundary. Final scoring runs separately on the host; +its import allowlist is a methodological guardrail, not hostile-code containment. + +## Code and Docker behavior + +| Module | Responsibility | +| --- | --- | +| `apptainer_sandbox.py` | Agent launch, CLI configuration, broker/relay lifetime | +| `model_broker.py` | Credentials, fixed provider endpoints, request validation | +| `isolated_transport.py` | Namespace checks and fixed-destination relays | +| `apptainer_environment.py` | Dependency preparation and clean child environment | + +Provider hostname constants are shared with Docker's registry. Docker retains its +firewall and credential transport; `ROBOCODE_FIREWALL_EXTRA_DOMAINS` configures Docker, +not the Apptainer broker. Strict Docker images use the same dependency-clean render +server and must also be rebuilt after render-image changes. + +Audit the actual node, runtime, and images before relying on isolation, and repeat +after relevant changes. See [red-teaming instructions](apptainer-red-teaming.md) +for controlled network checks and agent probes. Missing tools, unavailable positive +controls, provider refusals, and incomplete reports are not successful isolation tests. diff --git a/docs/blackbox.md b/docs/blackbox.md index c3995085..1dc61a8b 100644 --- a/docs/blackbox.md +++ b/docs/blackbox.md @@ -195,7 +195,8 @@ The approach, in `train()`: `{host, port, token, observation_space, action_space, max_steps}`. `host` is `host.docker.internal` for Docker (mapped via `--add-host host.docker.internal:host-gateway`) or `127.0.0.1` for the - apptainer and local backends. + Apptainer and local backends. Apptainer then rewrites the port to a private + loopback relay pinned to the separately configured host `env_server_port`. 4. Mounts a filtered copy of the repo that strips `environments/`, the kinder `envs/` and `demos/`, plus the always-excluded `oracles/`, `primitives/`, `tests/`, and `docs/`. @@ -230,10 +231,10 @@ makes blackbox meaningful differs: many `apptainer.conf` setups still bind the host `/home`, so the agent could read the real source straight off `/home//.../environments`. `--containall` is what fixes this, dropping all default binds (home, tmp, cwd) - so the stripped source is the only source present. It reaches the env server - over `127.0.0.1` (apptainer shares the host network namespace, so no - `--add-host`/firewall is needed; note this also means apptainer does not apply - the default-deny network firewall). Run + so the stripped source is the only source present. Its network namespace has + only loopback. A Unix-socket relay reaches one pinned host env-server port, and + a separate broker permits validated model inference. See + [network isolation](apptainer-network-isolation.md). Run `python integration_tests/red_team_sandbox.py --apptainer-blackbox` (needs `robocode-sandbox.sif` built) to verify env source stays unreachable. - **local**: best-effort ONLY, isolation is NOT enforced. The OS-level sandbox @@ -251,15 +252,16 @@ makes blackbox meaningful differs: only for quick local iteration, not for results that depend on the agent not having read the source. Use `docker` or `apptainer` for enforced isolation. -Strict mode runs under Docker or Apptainer during synthesis. The strict image gets -one writable mount (`/sandbox`). Under Docker its firewall allows the model provider -plus only the exact host TCP port of the environment server; GitHub, SSH, package -registries, and other host ports are not allowed. Under Apptainer the same image runs -as `robocode-strict-blackbox.sif` with the sandbox as its only mount, but, as in -legacy blackbox, unprivileged Apptainer cannot install the firewall, so that network -restriction is not enforced there: the strict ablation then rests on the -dependency-clean image, the strict env server, and the scoring-time import allowlist. -Scoring needs no container: the import allowlist check +Strict mode runs under Docker or Apptainer during synthesis. Under Docker its +firewall allows the model provider plus only the exact host TCP port of the +environment server; GitHub, SSH, package registries, and other host ports are not +allowed. Under Apptainer the dependency-clean `robocode-strict-blackbox.sif` runs +in a disconnected namespace with the sandbox, session directory, and read-only +broker socket directory mounted. Only validated model inference and the pinned +environment-server relay cross that network boundary. + +Final scoring currently runs on the host. Its import allowlist check is a +methodological guardrail, not a network or hostile-code sandbox. The check runs before the program is loaded, so an approach that imports `pybullet_helpers`, `tomsgeoms2d`, `robocode`, `kinder`, or any other undeclared dependency fails the run with a message naming the import instead of silently succeeding from the host @@ -324,7 +326,7 @@ state snapshots. | | sandbox_dir/mcp_renders/*.png +-------------------+---------------------------------------^---------+ | host.docker.internal:port (docker) | bind mount - | 127.0.0.1:port (apptainer/local) | (rw) + | 127.0.0.1:port (local only) | (rw) ====================+======= container boundary (firewall: | ========= | default-DROP + allow host /24) | | | @@ -351,6 +353,11 @@ state snapshots. Withheld: environments/ , kinder envs+demos , oracles/ , primitives/ , tests/ , docs/ ``` +Apptainer uses the same JSON protocol through a different transport: private +container loopback → mounted Unix socket → one pinned host environment-server +port. Its namespace has no external interface. The diagram's Docker firewall +and direct local connection do not describe Apptainer's network boundary. + ## Key takeaways - **One protocol, two consumers inside the sandbox.** The agent's own test @@ -361,7 +368,8 @@ state snapshots. host into the shared `mcp_renders/` mount; only relative paths travel back over the socket. - **Isolation is layered.** Withheld source mounts, JSON-only codec, per-run - token, per-connection fresh env, and a default-deny firewall. The `local` + token, per-connection fresh env, and Docker's firewall or Apptainer's + disconnected namespace with restricted relays. The `local` backend is best-effort only. ## Red-teaming strict blackbox @@ -371,21 +379,21 @@ Build the strict image, then run its dedicated live adversarial suite: ```bash bash docker/build_strict_blackbox.sh python integration_tests/red_team_sandbox.py --strict-blackbox -# Apptainer: the same suite minus the network probe (no firewall there). +# Apptainer: the same suite, including network and package-install probes. bash docker/build_strict_blackbox_sif.sh python integration_tests/red_team_sandbox.py --apptainer-strict-blackbox ``` The suite first proves the allowed surface works: the generated-program interpreter can import NumPy and SciPy and can reset and step the environment, and -the separate MCP interpreter renders a state through the host. +the same dependency-clean interpreter renders a state through the host. It then asks an agent to attack the same configuration used in production and fails if any of these boundaries break: - the generated-program interpreter imports RoboCode, KinDER, MCP, Gymnasium, geometry, or simulator packages, or installs a package from the network; -- the separate MCP interpreter exposes environment, primitive, simulator, or - robotics modules; +- changing interpreters/package paths, or executing a policy through MCP, + exposes withheld project, framework, environment, or simulator packages; - environment source, the host-side canary, or arbitrary Internet content is reachable through filesystem or network probing; - withheld client methods or raw protocol commands such as `get_state`, @@ -406,14 +414,19 @@ after scoring begins. Blackbox mode is a *methodological* constraint first: it stops the agent from reading environment source so it must discover the dynamics empirically. The isolation behind it (withheld mounts, JSON-only codec, per-run token, -per-connection env, default-deny firewall) is real. The host never executes -agent code: the only things it runs are env stepping and `render_state`, both -trusted. `render_policy` deliberately runs in the container, so an agent that +per-connection env, and backend-specific network restrictions) applies during +agent execution. The environment server runs trusted env stepping and +`render_state`, never agent code. `render_policy` deliberately runs in the container, so an agent that writes a malicious `approach.py` cannot reach the env source through rendering -(there is no env source in the container, and the host never execs the file). +(there is no env source in the container, and the environment server never +executes the file). The `blackbox_render_*` red-team tests exercise exactly this path. -One limit is worth stating plainly: +Final policy scoring is a separate host-side execution path and is not contained +by these agent-runtime protections. Full experiment network isolation requires +addressing that path too. + +Another limit: - **The env server listens on all interfaces.** It binds `0.0.0.0:` and the container firewall opens the host's `/24`, so diff --git a/experiments/conf/approach/best_of_k.yaml b/experiments/conf/approach/best_of_k.yaml index 01481c39..7f95f1d5 100644 --- a/experiments/conf/approach/best_of_k.yaml +++ b/experiments/conf/approach/best_of_k.yaml @@ -16,8 +16,7 @@ max_budget_usd: 20.0 # dollar cap; only bounds cost-reporting backends (null -> # true: each candidate repeats GenPlan's summary -> strategy -> code flow, no debug loop. chain_of_thought: false # The per-episode validation timeout is the shared top-level eval_timeout. -# Run the whole loop inside one sandbox container (like the agentic approach), -# so generated code never executes on the host. local runs in-process. -container_backend: docker # docker | apptainer | local +# Run candidate generation and validation in Docker. Final scoring still loads +# the policy on the host; local also runs generation in-process. +container_backend: docker # docker | local; Apptainer transport is unsupported docker_image: robocode-sandbox -sif_path: null # null -> /robocode-sandbox.sif diff --git a/experiments/conf/approach/llm_genplan.yaml b/experiments/conf/approach/llm_genplan.yaml index 9dd680b6..230a0a5a 100644 --- a/experiments/conf/approach/llm_genplan.yaml +++ b/experiments/conf/approach/llm_genplan.yaml @@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ max_debug_attempts: 4 # step cap: 1 initial attempt + this many debug attempts max_budget_usd: 20.0 # dollar cap; only bounds cost-reporting backends (null -> step cap only) chain_of_thought: true # summary -> strategy -> code; false: single prompt -> code # The per-episode validation timeout is the shared top-level eval_timeout. -# Run the whole genplan loop inside one sandbox container (like the agentic -# approach), so generated code never executes on the host. local runs in-process. -container_backend: docker # docker | apptainer | local +# Run generation and debugging in Docker. Final scoring still loads the policy +# on the host; local also runs generation in-process. +container_backend: docker # docker | local; Apptainer transport is unsupported docker_image: robocode-sandbox -sif_path: null # null -> /robocode-sandbox.sif diff --git a/integration_tests/red_team_sandbox.py b/integration_tests/red_team_sandbox.py index 1842ff27..7ca95b1b 100644 --- a/integration_tests/red_team_sandbox.py +++ b/integration_tests/red_team_sandbox.py @@ -858,6 +858,11 @@ async def _run_agent( """Run the agent using Apptainer, Docker, or OS-level sandboxing.""" if use_apptainer: apptainer_config = ApptainerSandboxConfig( + env_server_port=( + json.loads((SANDBOX_DIR / "env_spaces.json").read_text())["port"] + if blackbox and (SANDBOX_DIR / "env_spaces.json").exists() + else None + ), sandbox_dir=SANDBOX_DIR, prompt=prompt, output_filename="output.txt", @@ -1622,9 +1627,8 @@ async def _run_firewall_reinit() -> None: def _apptainer_firewall_reinit_probe() -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]: """Try to initialize the firewall from the normal Apptainer agent process. - Apptainer intentionally skips firewall initialization and shares the host network - namespace. Unlike the Docker probe, this cannot assert that outbound traffic is - blocked. It instead verifies the relevant privilege boundary: the non-fakeroot agent + Apptainer uses a disconnected network namespace instead of iptables. This probe + verifies the privilege boundary separately from the network audit: the agent cannot regain UID 0, use iptables, or invoke the firewall script successfully. """ script = r""" @@ -1675,8 +1679,6 @@ def _apptainer_firewall_reinit_probe() -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]: src_abs=str(src.resolve()), kindergarden_abs=str(kindergarden.resolve()), kinder_baselines_abs=None, - auth_args=[], - firewall_domains=[], agent_cmd=["bash", "-c", script], ) return subprocess.run( @@ -1836,8 +1838,6 @@ def build(sandbox: Path, script: str) -> list[str]: src_abs=str(src.resolve()), kindergarden_abs=str(kindergarden.resolve()), kinder_baselines_abs=None, - auth_args=[], - firewall_domains=[], agent_cmd=["bash", "-c", script], ) return _docker_run_prefix( diff --git a/src/robocode/approaches/agentic_base.py b/src/robocode/approaches/agentic_base.py index dd2aa64e..a5ddc292 100644 --- a/src/robocode/approaches/agentic_base.py +++ b/src/robocode/approaches/agentic_base.py @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ class that does both) is deliberate, so the generalized baseline cannot be broke import sys from collections.abc import Callable from contextlib import ExitStack +from dataclasses import replace from pathlib import Path from typing import Any, TypeVar @@ -334,6 +335,8 @@ def _run_sandbox( ), strict=self._blackbox_strict, ) + if self._blackbox and apptainer_config is not None: + apptainer_config = replace(apptainer_config, env_server_port=port) result = run_with_rate_limit_retry( docker_config, config, diff --git a/src/robocode/approaches/agentic_cdl_approach.py b/src/robocode/approaches/agentic_cdl_approach.py index 0180c18a..e4958ea7 100644 --- a/src/robocode/approaches/agentic_cdl_approach.py +++ b/src/robocode/approaches/agentic_cdl_approach.py @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import sys from collections.abc import Callable from contextlib import ExitStack +from dataclasses import replace from pathlib import Path from typing import Any, TypeVar @@ -302,6 +303,8 @@ def train(self) -> None: # noqa: C901 — mirrors AgenticApproach.train list(self._primitives) ), ) + if self._blackbox and apptainer_config is not None: + apptainer_config = replace(apptainer_config, env_server_port=port) result = run_with_rate_limit_retry( docker_config, config, diff --git a/src/robocode/approaches/llm_genplan_approach.py b/src/robocode/approaches/llm_genplan_approach.py index 2c3551f1..5c6ae455 100644 --- a/src/robocode/approaches/llm_genplan_approach.py +++ b/src/robocode/approaches/llm_genplan_approach.py @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ from robocode import prompts from robocode.approaches.base_approach import BaseApproach from robocode.primitive_descriptions import format_primitives_description -from robocode.utils.apptainer_sandbox import _DEFAULT_SIF, run_genplan_in_apptainer from robocode.utils.docker_sandbox import run_genplan_in_docker from robocode.utils.episode import load_generated_approach from robocode.utils.genplan_validate import ( @@ -88,7 +87,6 @@ def __init__( use_docker: bool = True, container_backend: str | None = None, docker_image: str = "robocode-sandbox", - sif_path: str | None = None, **kwargs: Any, ) -> None: super().__init__( @@ -102,6 +100,12 @@ def __init__( self._container_backend = resolve_container_backend( container_backend, use_docker ) + if self._container_backend == "apptainer": + raise ValueError( + "GenPlan/Best-of-K does not support the isolated Apptainer transport. " + "Use an agentic Codex/Claude approach on Apptainer. " + "GenPlan's existing Docker backend remains supported." + ) # Sandboxed runs build the client inside the container, so the host # needs no client/key. self._client: LLMClient | None = ( @@ -119,7 +123,6 @@ def __init__( self._chain_of_thought = chain_of_thought self._eval_timeout = eval_timeout self._docker_image = docker_image - self._sif_path = Path(sif_path) if sif_path is not None else _DEFAULT_SIF self._generated: Any = None self.total_cost_usd: float | None = None # Number of LLM generations made (debug attempts for genplan, candidates @@ -136,9 +139,9 @@ def train(self) -> None: "(max_debug_attempts / max_generation_steps)" ) - # Sandboxed: run the whole loop inside one container (docker/apptainer) + # Sandboxed: run the whole loop inside one Docker container # via the genplan driver; the driver reruns train() locally inside. - if self._container_backend in ("docker", "apptainer"): + if self._container_backend == "docker": self._train_in_container() self._load_generated(self._output_dir / "sandbox" / "approach.py") return @@ -222,20 +225,12 @@ def _train_in_container(self) -> None: config = self._driver_config(completion) (sandbox_dir / "genplan_config.json").write_text(json.dumps(config)) include_bilevel = "bilevel_models" in self._primitives - if self._container_backend == "apptainer": - run_genplan_in_apptainer( - sandbox_dir, - completion, - sif_path=self._sif_path, - include_bilevel=include_bilevel, - ) - else: - run_genplan_in_docker( - sandbox_dir, - completion, - image=self._docker_image, - include_bilevel=include_bilevel, - ) + run_genplan_in_docker( + sandbox_dir, + completion, + image=self._docker_image, + include_bilevel=include_bilevel, + ) cost = json.loads((sandbox_dir / "cost.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")) self.total_cost_usd = cost["total_cost_usd"] self.num_generations = cost.get("num_generations") diff --git a/src/robocode/utils/apptainer_environment.py b/src/robocode/utils/apptainer_environment.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..96fd88ce --- /dev/null +++ b/src/robocode/utils/apptainer_environment.py @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +"""Prepare trusted Python dependencies before starting isolated agent execution.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import fcntl +import hashlib +import os +import shutil +import subprocess +import tempfile +from pathlib import Path + + +def clean_apptainer_env() -> dict[str, str]: + """Never pass provider secrets or Apptainer override variables to children.""" + return { + key: os.environ[key] + for key in ( + "HOME", + "PATH", + "USER", + "LOGNAME", + "LANG", + "LC_ALL", + "TERM", + "TMPDIR", + ) + if key in os.environ + } + + +def prepared_environment(sif: Path, binds: list[str], *, include_bilevel: bool) -> Path: + """Cache a venv prepared without agent files, credentials, or session mounts. + + The preparation container is intentionally network-capable, but runs only the + trusted locked installer. Its completed venv is mounted read-only for agents. + Cache entries are never populated from an agent's writable container overlay. + """ + from robocode.utils.docker_sandbox import ( # pylint: disable=import-outside-toplevel + _find_repo_root, + ) + + root = _find_repo_root() + cache = root / ".apptainer-env-cache" + cache.mkdir(mode=0o700, exist_ok=True) + digest = hashlib.sha256() + digest.update(str(sif.resolve()).encode()) + digest.update(str((sif.stat().st_size, sif.stat().st_mtime_ns)).encode()) + digest.update(str(include_bilevel).encode()) + for path in ( + root / "pyproject.toml", + root / "uv.lock", + root / "third-party/kindergarden/pyproject.toml", + ): + digest.update(path.read_bytes()) + for bind in binds: + directory = Path(bind.split(":", 1)[0]) + if directory.is_dir(): + for metadata in sorted(directory.rglob("pyproject.toml")): + digest.update(str(metadata.relative_to(directory)).encode()) + digest.update(metadata.read_bytes()) + key = digest.hexdigest() + destination = cache / key + with (cache / (key + ".lock")).open("w", encoding="utf-8") as lock: + fcntl.flock(lock, fcntl.LOCK_EX) + if (destination / "READY").is_file(): + return destination / "venv" + if destination.exists(): + shutil.rmtree(destination) + temporary = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="prepare-", dir=cache)) + cmd = [ + "apptainer", + "exec", + "--userns", + "--containall", + "--cleanenv", + "--no-home", + "--writable-tmpfs", + "--pwd", + "/robocode", + "--bind", + f"{temporary}:/prepared", + ] + for bind in binds: + cmd += ["--bind", bind] + # Seed from the image to avoid redownloading its heavy runtime packages. + script = ( + "cp -a /robocode/.venv /prepared/venv && " + "UV_PROJECT_ENVIRONMENT=/prepared/venv " + "uv sync --frozen --python /usr/bin/python3.11" + ) + if include_bilevel: + script += " --extra bilevel" + cmd += [str(sif.resolve()), "/bin/sh", "-ec", script] + proc = subprocess.run( + cmd, + env=clean_apptainer_env(), + capture_output=True, + text=True, + timeout=600, + check=False, + ) + (temporary / "prepare.log").write_text( + proc.stdout + proc.stderr, encoding="utf-8" + ) + if proc.returncode: + raise RuntimeError( + "Trusted dependency preparation failed; inspect " + f"{temporary / 'prepare.log'}" + ) + # uv created console scripts for /prepared/venv; the runtime bind uses + # that same path. The agent interpreter remains /robocode/.venv/python + # via a second read-only bind for existing experiment configuration. + (temporary / "READY").write_text("1\n", encoding="utf-8") + temporary.rename(destination) + return destination / "venv" diff --git a/src/robocode/utils/apptainer_sandbox.py b/src/robocode/utils/apptainer_sandbox.py index 54b89db5..b5b0d26b 100644 --- a/src/robocode/utils/apptainer_sandbox.py +++ b/src/robocode/utils/apptainer_sandbox.py @@ -1,90 +1,60 @@ -"""Apptainer/Singularity-based sandboxed agent runner. - -Mirror of :mod:`robocode.utils.docker_sandbox` for environments where the -Docker daemon is unavailable (typical on HPC clusters). The SIF image is -built from the existing ``docker/Dockerfile`` via ``docker/build_sif.sh`` -(podman build + apptainer build) -- no separate definition file. - -The container interior (entrypoint, firewall script, /robocode/.venv, -bind-mount layout) is byte-for-byte identical to the Docker image. The -only differences are at the host invocation layer: - -* ``--bind`` instead of ``-v`` -* ``--env KEY=val`` instead of ``-e KEY=val`` -* ``--pwd`` instead of ``-w`` -* ``--writable-tmpfs`` so the entrypoint's ``uv sync`` can write to - ``/robocode/.venv`` (the SIF rootfs is read-only) -* ``--containall`` so administrator-configured home, tmp, and cwd binds do not - expose host files beyond the explicit filtered mounts -* ``--no-home`` so the host home doesn't shadow ``/home/node`` -* ``--cleanenv`` so the host env doesn't leak in -* ``--pid`` so the container gets its own PID namespace (Docker does this by - default; apptainer shares the host's unless asked) - -Namespaces: the filesystem, PID, and IPC namespaces are the container's own. -The NETWORK namespace is still the host's: ``--net`` needs -privileges the unprivileged cluster install does not have, which is also why the -firewall is skipped. So host loopback services stay reachable from the sandbox, -and the render http server must pick a free host port (see ``_free_port``). - -``init-firewall.sh`` is skipped via ``ROBOCODE_SKIP_FIREWALL=1``: the -unprivileged apptainer install on the target cluster can't grant real -``CAP_NET_ADMIN``, so iptables would fail. - -The image ENTRYPOINT is invoked explicitly rather than via -``apptainer run`` so behaviour does not depend on Apptainer's runscript -translation of Docker images. - -Strict blackbox runs (``blackbox_strict=True``) execute in -``robocode-strict-blackbox.sif`` instead, built from -``docker/Dockerfile.strict-blackbox`` via ``docker/build_strict_blackbox_sif.sh``. -No project code is bound into it: the sandbox is the only mount. The strict -firewall (model provider plus the env server's port) cannot be installed here -for the same reason the regular one is skipped, so under Apptainer the strict -ablation rests on the dependency-clean image, the strict env server, and the -host-side import allowlist at scoring time. +"""Apptainer agent runner with an isolated network and host inference broker. + +Agents run without root in a fresh user/network/PID/IPC namespace using +``--net --network none``, filtered mounts, a clean environment, and no-new-privileges. +A supervisor verifies the network and capability boundary before starting the CLI. +The host broker accepts only validated model inference over a mounted Unix socket; +provider credentials remain on the host. A separate socket relays to one pinned +experiment environment server. Neither relay provides general internet access. + +Regular Python dependencies are prepared in a trusted installer phase and mounted +read-only; the agent phase never runs the network-dependent image entrypoint. +Strict runs use the dependency-clean strict SIF. Unsupported backend/GenPlan paths +fail closed. See ``docs/apptainer-network-isolation.md`` for evidence and limits. """ from __future__ import annotations +import json import logging -import os +import shutil import subprocess import tempfile +import threading import time import uuid from collections.abc import Iterator from contextlib import ExitStack, contextmanager, nullcontext from dataclasses import dataclass from pathlib import Path -from typing import Any from robocode.mcp import MCP_STARTUP_TIMEOUT_MS -from robocode.utils.backends import ( - PROVIDERS, - AgentBackend, - firewall_domains_for_provider, - provider_from_model, +from robocode.utils.apptainer_environment import ( + clean_apptainer_env, + prepared_environment, ) -from robocode.utils.claude_auth import ( - sandbox_claude_session_store, - throwaway_claude_config, -) -from robocode.utils.codex_auth import sandbox_codex_sessions, throwaway_codex_home +from robocode.utils.backends import AgentBackend +from robocode.utils.claude_auth import sandbox_claude_session_store +from robocode.utils.codex_auth import sandbox_codex_sessions from robocode.utils.docker_sandbox import ( DOCKER_PYTHON, - GENPLAN_CONTAINER_TIMEOUT_S, _filtered_repo_mounts, _find_repo_root, - _get_claude_oauth_token, _mcp_prestart_wrapper, container_python, ) +from robocode.utils.isolated_transport import UnixRelay +from robocode.utils.model_broker import ( + BROKER_DIR, + MODEL_PORT, + BrokerUpstream, + load_broker_upstream, + model_broker, +) from robocode.utils.sandbox import ( SandboxConfig, SandboxResult, _final_commit, - _free_port, _initial_commit, _setup_sandbox_dir, _stream_result_to_sandbox_result, @@ -133,6 +103,8 @@ class ApptainerSandboxConfig(SandboxConfig): sif_path: Path = _DEFAULT_SIF blackbox_strict: bool = False strict_sif_path: Path = _DEFAULT_STRICT_SIF + # Trusted host destination. Never inferred from agent-writable metadata. + env_server_port: int | None = None def sif_path_for(config: ApptainerSandboxConfig) -> Path: @@ -140,67 +112,6 @@ def sif_path_for(config: ApptainerSandboxConfig) -> Path: return config.strict_sif_path if config.blackbox_strict else config.sif_path -@contextmanager -def _build_apptainer_auth_args( - backend_name: str, -) -> Iterator[tuple[list[str], dict[str, str]]]: - """Yield Apptainer CLI args and env vars for backend authentication. - - Mirrors :func:`docker_sandbox._build_docker_auth_args`. Secrets (the - Claude OAuth token, provider API keys) are returned as host env vars - with Apptainer's ``APPTAINERENV_`` prefix rather than inline ``--env`` - flags: Apptainer injects ``APPTAINERENV_*`` into the container even - under ``--cleanenv``, and the value never reaches argv (world-readable - via ``ps`` / ``/proc//cmdline`` on shared nodes). Only non-secret - bind mounts are returned as CLI args. - - The credentials fallback uses a writable throwaway copy, never the live - host config, so experiment reads and writes cannot leak across runs or into - the operator's Claude history. - """ - apptainer_args: list[str] = [] - extra_env: dict[str, str] = {} - - with ExitStack() as stack: - if backend_name == "claude": - oauth_token = _get_claude_oauth_token() - if oauth_token: - # APPTAINERENV_ prefix, not an inline --env flag, so the secret is - # injected into the container (surviving --cleanenv) without ever - # appearing on the command line. - extra_env["APPTAINERENV_CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"] = oauth_token - else: - logger.warning( - "No Claude OAuth token found; falling back to a throwaway " - "credentials-only config. Run `claude login` on the host " - "if the container cannot authenticate." - ) - claude_copy = stack.enter_context(throwaway_claude_config()) - apptainer_args += ["--bind", f"{claude_copy}:/home/node/.claude"] - elif backend_name == "codex": - if os.environ.get("CODEX_API_KEY"): - extra_env["APPTAINERENV_CODEX_API_KEY"] = os.environ["CODEX_API_KEY"] - else: - codex_home = stack.enter_context(throwaway_codex_home()) - apptainer_args += ["--bind", f"{codex_home}:/home/node/.codex"] - else: - opencode_data = Path.home() / ".local" / "share" / "opencode" - if opencode_data.exists(): - apptainer_args += [ - "--bind", - f"{opencode_data}:/home/node/.local/share/opencode", - ] - - for info in PROVIDERS.values(): - if info.api_key_env: - val = os.environ.get(info.api_key_env) - if val: - # APPTAINERENV_ keeps the key off argv (see above). - extra_env[f"APPTAINERENV_{info.api_key_env}"] = val - - yield apptainer_args, extra_env - - def _apptainer_exec_prefix() -> list[str]: """Return the filesystem/process isolation shared by all Apptainer runs.""" # --no-home alone does not reliably suppress administrator-configured host @@ -209,6 +120,10 @@ def _apptainer_exec_prefix() -> list[str]: return [ "apptainer", "exec", + "--userns", + "--net", + "--network", + "none", "--containall", # Apptainer shares the host PID namespace by default, so a `pkill -f` # inside the container could otherwise reach the harness, concurrent @@ -229,8 +144,6 @@ def _build_apptainer_cmd( src_abs: str | None, kindergarden_abs: str | None, kinder_baselines_abs: str | None, - auth_args: list[str], - firewall_domains: list[str], agent_cmd: list[str], extra_binds: list[str] | None = None, ss_pybullet_abs: str | None = None, @@ -240,8 +153,9 @@ def _build_apptainer_cmd( Split out from :func:`run_agent_in_apptainer_sandbox` so unit tests can inspect the constructed command without running anything. - A strict blackbox launch passes ``None`` for the repo mounts: its image holds - no project code, so the sandbox is the only mount. + Strict blackbox launches omit project source mounts. The high-level runner + adds the broker and session mounts. This builder never installs dependencies + or forwards provider credentials and firewall settings. """ cmd = _apptainer_exec_prefix() cmd += [ @@ -253,8 +167,6 @@ def _build_apptainer_cmd( # tools (--containall drops the host env, so this must be explicit). "--env", f"MCP_TIMEOUT={MCP_STARTUP_TIMEOUT_MS}", - "--env", - "ROBOCODE_SKIP_FIREWALL=1", # Headless container has no GPU, so mujoco's Dynamic3D offscreen renderer # must use OSMesa (software); EGL device displays fail without a GPU. "--env", @@ -263,19 +175,6 @@ def _build_apptainer_cmd( "PYOPENGL_PLATFORM=osmesa", ] - if firewall_domains: - cmd += [ - "--env", - f"ROBOCODE_FIREWALL_EXTRA_DOMAINS={','.join(firewall_domains)}", - ] - - # Only when the bilevel_models primitive is in play: sync the bilevel extra - # (the bind is added below). Otherwise no bilevel source/deps enter the sandbox. - if kinder_baselines_abs is not None: - cmd += ["--env", "ROBOCODE_UV_EXTRA_ARGS=--extra bilevel"] - - cmd += auth_args - cmd += ["--bind", f"{sandbox_abs}:/sandbox"] if src_abs is not None: cmd += ["--bind", f"{src_abs}:/robocode/src"] @@ -292,23 +191,116 @@ def _build_apptainer_cmd( cmd += ["--bind", bind] cmd += [ str(sif_path_for(config)), - "/usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh", + "/usr/bin/setpriv", + "--no-new-privs", + "--", ] cmd += agent_cmd return cmd +@contextmanager +def _isolated_transport( + config: ApptainerSandboxConfig, provider: BrokerUpstream +) -> Iterator[Path]: + """Own the broker and optional pinned environment relay for one agent run.""" + with ExitStack() as isolation: + bridge = Path( + isolation.enter_context(tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="robocode-net-")) + ) + isolation.enter_context( + model_broker(bridge, provider, config.sandbox_dir.parent / "broker.jsonl") + ) + shutil.copyfile( + Path(__file__).with_name("isolated_transport.py"), bridge / "transport.py" + ) + listeners = [{"port": MODEL_PORT, "socket": f"{BROKER_DIR}/model.sock"}] + # Only immutable host configuration selects a destination. Sandbox metadata + # describes the client view and never authorizes a host connection. + metadata_path = config.sandbox_dir / "env_spaces.json" + port = config.env_server_port + if metadata_path.exists() and port is None: + raise RuntimeError( + "env_spaces.json requires an explicit trusted env_server_port" + ) + if port is not None: + if ( + isinstance(port, bool) + or not isinstance(port, int) + or not 1 <= port <= 65535 + ): + raise RuntimeError("Invalid trusted environment server port") + metadata = json.loads(metadata_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) + relay = isolation.enter_context( + UnixRelay(str(bridge / "environment.sock"), ("127.0.0.1", port)) + ) + thread = threading.Thread(target=relay.serve_forever, daemon=True) + thread.start() + isolation.callback(thread.join, 5) + isolation.callback(relay.shutdown) + listeners.append( + {"port": MODEL_PORT + 1, "socket": f"{BROKER_DIR}/environment.sock"} + ) + metadata.update(host="127.0.0.1", port=MODEL_PORT + 1) + (config.sandbox_dir / "env_spaces.json").write_text( + json.dumps(metadata), encoding="utf-8" + ) + (bridge / "transport.json").write_text( + json.dumps( + {"listeners": listeners, "strict_blackbox": config.blackbox_strict} + ), + encoding="utf-8", + ) + yield bridge + + +def _model_client( + backend_name: str, agent_cmd: list[str] +) -> tuple[list[str], dict[str, str]]: + """Point a CLI at the local broker using inert tokens; never load real auth.""" + agent_cmd = list(agent_cmd) + local_token = "local-broker-no-provider-secret" + client_env = { + "APPTAINERENV_ROBOCODE_MODEL_TOKEN": local_token, + "APPTAINERENV_UV_OFFLINE": "1", + "APPTAINERENV_PIP_NO_INDEX": "1", + } + if backend_name == "claude": + client_env.update( + { + "APPTAINERENV_ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL": f"http://127.0.0.1:{MODEL_PORT}", + "APPTAINERENV_ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN": local_token, + "APPTAINERENV_CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC": "1", + } + ) + if backend_name == "codex": + # Explicit custom provider avoids giving the CLI any real credential. + # Transport is SSE; websocket upgrades are rejected at the broker. + overrides = { + "model_provider": "robocode", + "model_providers.robocode.name": "Robocode isolated broker", + "model_providers.robocode.base_url": f"http://127.0.0.1:{MODEL_PORT}/v1", + "model_providers.robocode.wire_api": "responses", + "model_providers.robocode.env_key": "ROBOCODE_MODEL_TOKEN", + "model_providers.robocode.supports_websockets": False, + "features.responses_websockets": False, + "features.responses_websockets_v2": False, + } + for key, value in overrides.items(): + agent_cmd[-1:-1] = ["--config", f"{key}={json.dumps(value)}"] + return agent_cmd, client_env + + async def run_agent_in_apptainer_sandbox( config: ApptainerSandboxConfig, backend: AgentBackend, ) -> SandboxResult: - """Run an agent inside the ``robocode-sandbox`` SIF via apptainer. - - Step-for-step parallel of - :func:`~robocode.utils.docker_sandbox.run_agent_in_docker_sandbox`. - See the module docstring for the docker -> apptainer flag mapping. - """ + """Run a supported agent with isolated networking and validated inference.""" backend_name = backend.name + if getattr(backend, "_base_url", ""): + raise RuntimeError( + "Custom model endpoints are not supported by the isolated broker" + ) strict_blackbox = config.blackbox_strict sif_path = sif_path_for(config) @@ -322,13 +314,13 @@ async def run_agent_in_apptainer_sandbox( f"SIF image not found at {sif_path}; build it with: bash {build_script}" ) + provider = load_broker_upstream(backend_name) _setup_sandbox_dir(config) sandbox_abs = str(config.sandbox_dir.resolve()) run_id = f"apptainer-sandbox-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}" - # The strict image holds no project code, so nothing is mounted beside the - # sandbox. + # The strict image needs no project source mounts. mounts = ( nullcontext((None, None, None, None)) if strict_blackbox @@ -344,22 +336,31 @@ async def run_agent_in_apptainer_sandbox( filtered_kinder_baselines, ss_pybullet, ), - _build_apptainer_auth_args(backend_name) as (auth_args, auth_env), + _isolated_transport(config, provider) as bridge, ): - firewall_domains: list[str] = [] - if backend_name in {"opencode", "codex"}: - firewall_domains = firewall_domains_for_provider( - "codex" - if backend_name == "codex" - else provider_from_model(config.model) + transport_binds = [f"{bridge}:{BROKER_DIR}:ro"] + if not strict_blackbox: + preparation_binds = [ + f"{filtered_src}:/robocode/src", + f"{filtered_kindergarden}:/robocode/third-party/kindergarden", + f"{_find_repo_root() / 'pyproject.toml'}:/robocode/pyproject.toml:ro", + f"{_find_repo_root() / 'uv.lock'}:/robocode/uv.lock:ro", + ] + if filtered_kinder_baselines is not None: + preparation_binds.append( + f"{filtered_kinder_baselines}:/robocode/third-party/kinder-baselines" + ) + venv = prepared_environment( + sif_path, + preparation_binds, + include_bilevel=filtered_kinder_baselines is not None, ) - - # Apptainer shares the host network namespace (even with --containall and - # --pid), so use a free loopback port for the render http server to avoid - # colliding with the host or a concurrent run. - mcp_port = _free_port() - # Under strict the agent's scripts run in the dependency-clean venv and - # the render proxy in its own, so MCP packages never reach the former. + transport_binds += [ + f"{venv}:/robocode/.venv:ro", + f"{venv}:/prepared/venv:ro", + ] + mcp_port = MODEL_PORT + 2 + # Strict rendering uses the same dependency-clean interpreter as agents. agent_python = container_python(strict_blackbox) mcp_python = agent_python agent_cmd = backend.build_cli_cmd( @@ -371,6 +372,7 @@ async def run_agent_in_apptainer_sandbox( mcp_transport="http", mcp_port=mcp_port, ) + agent_cmd, client_env = _model_client(backend_name, agent_cmd) # Start and health-check the render server before the CLI (same wrapper # as docker) so its tools are connected on the agent's first turn. if config.mcp_tools: @@ -380,7 +382,7 @@ async def run_agent_in_apptainer_sandbox( # Persist the CLI session store under the sandbox dir (survives the # ephemeral container) so a rate-limited run can be resumed via - # --continue in a fresh retry container. Claude only. + # the backend resume command in a fresh retry container. session_binds: list[str] = [] if backend_name == "claude": sessions_dir = sandbox_claude_session_store(config.sandbox_dir) @@ -407,10 +409,13 @@ async def run_agent_in_apptainer_sandbox( if filtered_kinder_baselines is not None else None ), - auth_args=auth_args, - firewall_domains=firewall_domains, - agent_cmd=agent_cmd, - extra_binds=session_binds + tel_binds, + agent_cmd=[ + agent_python, + f"{BROKER_DIR}/transport.py", + f"{BROKER_DIR}/transport.json", + *agent_cmd, + ], + extra_binds=session_binds + tel_binds + transport_binds, ) backend.setup_sandbox_files( @@ -420,7 +425,8 @@ async def run_agent_in_apptainer_sandbox( ) _initial_commit(config.sandbox_dir) - env = backend.build_env(config, auth_env if auth_env else None) + env = clean_apptainer_env() + env.update(client_env) env.update(tel_env) logger.info( @@ -444,6 +450,8 @@ async def run_agent_in_apptainer_sandbox( stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=stderr_file, text=True, + # Claude stops capped runs via killpg(proc.pid); own the group. + start_new_session=True, ) stream = backend.parse_stream( @@ -451,6 +459,10 @@ async def run_agent_in_apptainer_sandbox( stream_log_path=config.sandbox_dir.parent / "stream.jsonl", stderr_file=stderr_file, ) + stderr_file.seek(0) + (config.sandbox_dir.parent / "container.stderr").write_text( + stderr_file.read(), encoding="utf-8" + ) wall_time_s = time.monotonic() - wall_start logger.info( @@ -469,94 +481,3 @@ async def run_agent_in_apptainer_sandbox( config.output_filename, wall_time_s=wall_time_s, ) - - -def run_genplan_in_apptainer( - sandbox_dir: Path, - completion_cfg: dict[str, Any], - sif_path: Path = _DEFAULT_SIF, - timeout: float = GENPLAN_CONTAINER_TIMEOUT_S, - include_bilevel: bool = False, -) -> None: - """Apptainer analog of :func:`docker_sandbox.run_genplan_in_docker`. - - Mirrors the docker function: runs the whole LLM-GenPlan loop inside one - sandbox container via the genplan driver, which reads - ``sandbox_dir/genplan_config.json`` and writes ``sandbox_dir/approach.py`` - and ``sandbox_dir/cost.json``. Keeps ``primitives`` in the source mount so - the policy can build/use them as eval does on the host. With *include_bilevel* - (the genplan config requested ``bilevel_models``), the kinder-baselines source - is mounted and ``uv sync --extra bilevel`` runs so the models are importable. - """ - if not sif_path.exists(): - raise RuntimeError( - f"SIF image not found at {sif_path}; build it with: bash docker/build_sif.sh" - ) - run_id = f"apptainer-genplan-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}" - auth_backend = "claude" if completion_cfg["provider"] == "cli" else "opencode" - with ( - _filtered_repo_mounts( - keep_primitives=True, include_bilevel=include_bilevel - ) as ( - filtered_src, - filtered_kindergarden, - filtered_kinder_baselines, - ss_pybullet, - ), - _build_apptainer_auth_args(auth_backend) as (auth_args, auth_env), - ): - firewall_domains = firewall_domains_for_provider( - completion_cfg["provider"], completion_cfg.get("base_url", "") - ) - firewall_env: list[str] = [] - if firewall_domains: - firewall_env = [ - "--env", - f"ROBOCODE_FIREWALL_EXTRA_DOMAINS={','.join(firewall_domains)}", - ] - # With bilevel_models, mount the kinder-baselines path deps and tell the - # entrypoint to `uv sync --extra bilevel` (mirrors _docker_run_prefix). - bilevel_env: list[str] = [] - bilevel_bind: list[str] = [] - ss_pybullet_bind: list[str] = [] - if ss_pybullet is not None: - ss_pybullet_bind = [ - "--bind", - f"{ss_pybullet.resolve()}:/robocode/third-party/ss-pybullet:ro", - ] - if filtered_kinder_baselines is not None: - bilevel_env = ["--env", "ROBOCODE_UV_EXTRA_ARGS=--extra bilevel"] - bilevel_bind = [ - "--bind", - f"{filtered_kinder_baselines.resolve()}" - ":/robocode/third-party/kinder-baselines", - ] - apptainer_cmd = [ - *_apptainer_exec_prefix(), - "--env", - "ROBOCODE_SKIP_FIREWALL=1", - *firewall_env, - *bilevel_env, - *auth_args, - "--bind", - f"{sandbox_dir.resolve()}:/sandbox", - "--bind", - f"{filtered_src.resolve()}:/robocode/src", - "--bind", - f"{filtered_kindergarden.resolve()}:/robocode/third-party/kindergarden", - *ss_pybullet_bind, - *bilevel_bind, - str(sif_path), - "/usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh", - APPTAINER_PYTHON, - "-m", - "robocode.approaches.genplan_driver", - ] - logger.info("Starting genplan Apptainer run %s sif=%s", run_id, sif_path) - subprocess.run( - apptainer_cmd, - env={**os.environ, **auth_env}, - stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, - check=True, - timeout=timeout, - ) diff --git a/src/robocode/utils/backends/__init__.py b/src/robocode/utils/backends/__init__.py index 2c884e40..b2683acc 100644 --- a/src/robocode/utils/backends/__init__.py +++ b/src/robocode/utils/backends/__init__.py @@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ To add a new provider, add an entry to :data:`PROVIDERS` below. The ``domains`` list is used by the Docker firewall whitelist, and ``api_key_env`` is the environment variable forwarded into Docker -containers for authentication. +containers for authentication. Registering a provider here does not enable it +in the Apptainer broker: that transport requires an explicitly validated API +protocol in ``model_broker.py``. """ from dataclasses import dataclass, field @@ -75,19 +77,26 @@ class ProviderInfo: api_key_env: str = "" +# Fixed provider hosts shared by Docker's domain list and the inference broker. +# These constants are destinations, not interchangeable network policies. +OPENAI_API_HOST = "api.openai.com" +ANTHROPIC_API_HOST = "api.anthropic.com" +CODEX_CHATGPT_HOST = "chatgpt.com" + + # ---- Provider registry ---- # Add new providers here. The key is the provider prefix used in model # strings (e.g. "openai" in "openai/gpt-4o"). PROVIDERS: dict[str, ProviderInfo] = { "openai": ProviderInfo( - domains=["api.openai.com"], + domains=[OPENAI_API_HOST], api_key_env="OPENAI_API_KEY", ), "codex": ProviderInfo( - domains=["api.openai.com", "chatgpt.com", "ab.chatgpt.com"], + domains=[OPENAI_API_HOST, CODEX_CHATGPT_HOST, "ab.chatgpt.com"], ), "anthropic": ProviderInfo( - domains=["api.anthropic.com"], + domains=[ANTHROPIC_API_HOST], api_key_env="ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", ), "google": ProviderInfo( diff --git a/src/robocode/utils/env_server.py b/src/robocode/utils/env_server.py index 126a2055..f4b97db5 100644 --- a/src/robocode/utils/env_server.py +++ b/src/robocode/utils/env_server.py @@ -234,8 +234,10 @@ def write_env_spaces( """Write ``env_spaces.json``, the metadata the sandbox's env_client reads. The host is ``host.docker.internal`` for Docker (mapped to the host - gateway via ``--add-host``) and ``127.0.0.1`` for the apptainer and local - backends, which share the host's loopback. *primitives_manifest* (from + gateway via ``--add-host``) and ``127.0.0.1`` for local and Apptainer. Local + uses host loopback directly; Apptainer rewrites the port to its private + loopback relay using the explicit trusted ``env_server_port`` config. + *primitives_manifest* (from :func:`robocode.primitives.blackbox_primitive_manifest`) tells the sandbox how to rebuild the eval-time primitives; the caller passes it rather than this module importing the primitives package, keeping the host process diff --git a/src/robocode/utils/isolated_transport.py b/src/robocode/utils/isolated_transport.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7e37a63f --- /dev/null +++ b/src/robocode/utils/isolated_transport.py @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +"""Small fixed-destination stream relays; runnable with the container stdlib. + +The container listeners connect ONLY to named Unix sockets. There is no network +bridge, DNS forwarding, SOCKS negotiation, CONNECT support, or destination field. +Host-side environment relays have one destination selected by trusted code. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import json +import os +import pkgutil +import select +import signal +import socket +import socketserver +import subprocess +import sys +import threading +from contextlib import ExitStack +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Any + + +def copy_streams(left: socket.socket, right: socket.socket) -> None: + """Copy duplex streams while preserving half-close semantics.""" + readable = [left, right] + while readable: + ready, _, _ = select.select(readable, [], [], 120) + if not ready: + return + for source in ready: + target = right if source is left else left + data = source.recv(65536) + if data: + target.sendall(data) + else: + readable.remove(source) + target.shutdown(socket.SHUT_WR) + + +class RelayHandler(socketserver.BaseRequestHandler): + """Relay bytes to the one address configured by the trusted parent.""" + + def handle(self) -> None: + try: + target = self.server.target # type: ignore[attr-defined] + if isinstance(target, str): + remote = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) + remote.settimeout(120) + remote.connect(target) + else: + remote = socket.create_connection(target, timeout=120) + with remote: + copy_streams(self.request, remote) + except OSError: + pass + + +class UnixRelay(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, socketserver.UnixStreamServer): + """Host endpoint pinned to a single loopback environment server.""" + + daemon_threads = True + block_on_close = False + + def __init__(self, path: str, target: tuple[str, int]): + self.target = target + super().__init__(path, RelayHandler) + + +class TCPRelay(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, socketserver.TCPServer): + """Container loopback endpoint pinned to a mounted Unix socket.""" + + daemon_threads = True + block_on_close = False + allow_reuse_address = True + + def __init__(self, port: int, target: str): + self.target = target + super().__init__(("127.0.0.1", port), RelayHandler) + + +def verify_namespace() -> None: + """Refuse to execute any agent unless the kernel boundary is established.""" + if os.getuid() == 0 or {name for _, name in socket.if_nameindex()} != {"lo"}: + raise RuntimeError( + "Apptainer isolation requires a non-root, loopback-only namespace" + ) + if len(Path("/proc/net/route").read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()) != 1: + raise RuntimeError("Unexpected route in isolated namespace") + status = dict( + line.split(":", 1) + for line in Path("/proc/self/status").read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines() + ) + for key in ("CapEff", "CapPrm", "CapBnd", "CapInh", "CapAmb"): + if int(status[key].strip(), 16): + raise RuntimeError("Agent retains capabilities") + if status["NoNewPrivs"].strip() != "1": + raise RuntimeError("NoNewPrivs is required") + + +def verify_strict_runtime() -> None: + """Reject old images and readable third-party Python package environments. + + This startup guard supplements the image audit; a virtualenv alone does not + stop an agent from reading another interpreter's packages. + """ + if ( + Path("/opt/robocode-mcp").exists() + or not Path("/opt/robocode-render/strict_server.py").is_file() + ): + raise RuntimeError("Rebuild the strict image: legacy MCP environment is unsafe") + roots = [Path("/opt"), Path("/usr/lib"), Path("/usr/local/lib")] + package_dirs = [ + directory + for root in roots + for pattern in ("**/site-packages", "**/dist-packages") + for directory in root.glob(pattern) + if directory.is_dir() + ] + unexpected = { + module.name + for module in pkgutil.iter_modules([str(path) for path in package_dirs]) + if module.name not in {"numpy", "scipy"} + } + if unexpected: + raise RuntimeError(f"Unexpected strict-image packages: {sorted(unexpected)}") + + +def main() -> None: + """Start local relays only after verifying isolation, then supervise the CLI.""" + verify_namespace() + config: dict[str, Any] = json.loads(Path(sys.argv[1]).read_text(encoding="utf-8")) + if config.get("strict_blackbox"): + verify_strict_runtime() + with ExitStack() as stack: + for listener in config["listeners"]: + server = stack.enter_context(TCPRelay(listener["port"], listener["socket"])) + thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True) + thread.start() + stack.callback(thread.join, 5) + stack.callback(server.shutdown) + child = subprocess.Popen(sys.argv[2:]) # pylint: disable=consider-using-with + signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, lambda *_: child.terminate()) + try: + code = child.wait() + finally: + if child.poll() is None: + child.kill() + child.wait() + raise SystemExit(code) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main() diff --git a/src/robocode/utils/model_broker.py b/src/robocode/utils/model_broker.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..39f411c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/robocode/utils/model_broker.py @@ -0,0 +1,494 @@ +"""Host-owned inference broker for network-disconnected Apptainer agents. + +Only this process holds provider credentials. The Unix socket exposes a small +HTTP API, not CONNECT or an arbitrary destination proxy. Request bodies are +validated before forwarding to fixed HTTPS endpoints; redirects are never followed. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import base64 +import binascii +import http.client +import json +import os +import socketserver +import ssl +import threading +from collections.abc import Iterator +from contextlib import contextmanager +from dataclasses import dataclass, field +from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Any + +from robocode.utils.backends import ( + ANTHROPIC_API_HOST, + CODEX_CHATGPT_HOST, + OPENAI_API_HOST, +) +from robocode.utils.claude_auth import host_claude_config_dir +from robocode.utils.codex_auth import host_codex_home + +MAX_BODY = 32 * 1024 * 1024 +MODEL_PORT = 18080 +BROKER_DIR = "/run/robocode-broker" + + +class BrokerPolicyError(ValueError): + """A request is outside the explicitly supported inference protocol.""" + + +def _no_duplicates(pairs: list[tuple[str, Any]]) -> dict[str, Any]: + result: dict[str, Any] = {} + for key, value in pairs: + if key in result: + raise BrokerPolicyError("duplicate JSON key") + result[key] = value + return result + + +def _local_content(value: Any) -> None: + """Reject provider-side URL/file retrieval in actual content (not prose).""" + if isinstance(value, list): + for child in value: + _local_content(child) + elif isinstance(value, dict): + kind = value.get("type", "") + if isinstance(kind, str) and ( + kind.startswith( + ( + "web_", + "mcp_", + "server_", + "computer_", + "code_interpreter", + "file_search", + ) + ) + or kind + in { + "tool_search_call", + "tool_search_output", + "item_reference", + "input_file", + "document", + } + ): + raise BrokerPolicyError("server-side content operation") + for key, child in value.items(): + if key in {"url", "image_url"}: + if not isinstance(child, str): + raise BrokerPolicyError("remote content URL") + prefix, sep, encoded = child.partition(",") + if not sep or prefix not in { + "data:image/png;base64", + "data:image/jpeg;base64", + "data:image/webp;base64", + "data:image/gif;base64", + }: + raise BrokerPolicyError("only inline raster images are supported") + try: + base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True) + except (ValueError, binascii.Error) as exc: + raise BrokerPolicyError("invalid inline image") from exc + if key in {"file_url", "file_id", "container_id", "server_url"}: + raise BrokerPolicyError("remote content reference") + if key == "source" and isinstance(child, dict): + if child.get("type") not in {"base64", "text"}: + raise BrokerPolicyError("remote content source") + if child.get("type") == "base64" and child.get("media_type") not in { + "image/png", + "image/jpeg", + "image/webp", + "image/gif", + }: + raise BrokerPolicyError("only inline raster images are supported") + _local_content(child) + + +def _schemas(value: Any) -> None: + if isinstance(value, dict): + for key, child in value.items(): + if key == "$ref" and ( + not isinstance(child, str) or not child.startswith("#") + ): + raise BrokerPolicyError("remote schema reference") + _schemas(child) + elif isinstance(value, list): + for child in value: + _schemas(child) + + +def _openai_tools(tools: Any) -> None: + if not isinstance(tools, list): + raise BrokerPolicyError("tools must be a list") + for tool in tools: + if not isinstance(tool, dict): + raise BrokerPolicyError("invalid tool") + kind = tool.get("type") + if kind == "namespace": + if set(tool) - {"type", "name", "description", "tools"}: + raise BrokerPolicyError("unsupported namespace fields") + _openai_tools(tool.get("tools")) + elif kind == "function": + if set(tool) - { + "type", + "name", + "description", + "parameters", + "strict", + "defer_loading", + }: + raise BrokerPolicyError("unsupported function fields") + _schemas(tool) + elif kind == "custom": + if set(tool) - {"type", "name", "description", "format", "defer_loading"}: + raise BrokerPolicyError("unsupported custom tool fields") + else: + raise BrokerPolicyError("server-side tools are forbidden") + + +def validate_request(protocol: str, path: str, raw: bytes) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Parse a bounded request and fail closed on unsupported API operations.""" + if len(raw) > MAX_BODY: + raise BrokerPolicyError("body too large") + try: + data = json.loads(raw, object_pairs_hook=_no_duplicates) + except (ValueError, RecursionError) as exc: + raise BrokerPolicyError("invalid JSON") from exc + if not isinstance(data, dict): + raise BrokerPolicyError("body must be an object") + if protocol == "responses": + if path not in {"/v1/responses", "/v1/responses/compact"}: + raise BrokerPolicyError("endpoint forbidden") + allowed = { + "model", + "instructions", + "input", + "tools", + "tool_choice", + "parallel_tool_calls", + "stream", + "store", + "reasoning", + "text", + "include", + "prompt_cache_key", + "service_tier", + "max_output_tokens", + "temperature", + "top_p", + "metadata", + "truncation", + "prompt_cache_retention", + "safety_identifier", + "client_metadata", + } + if set(data) - allowed: + raise BrokerPolicyError( + "unsupported fields: " + ",".join(sorted(set(data) - allowed)) + ) + data.pop("client_metadata", None) # do not grant authority via client hints + _openai_tools(data.get("tools", [])) + choice = data.get("tool_choice", "auto") + if not ( + choice in ("auto", "none", "required") + if isinstance(choice, str) + else isinstance(choice, dict) + and choice.get("type") in {"function", "custom"} + ): + raise BrokerPolicyError("unsupported tool choice") + if any( + item != "reasoning.encrypted_content" for item in data.get("include", []) + ): + raise BrokerPolicyError("unsupported include") + _local_content(data.get("input")) + _schemas(data.get("text")) + elif protocol == "messages": + if path not in { + "/v1/messages", + "/v1/messages?beta=true", + "/v1/messages/count_tokens", + "/v1/messages/count_tokens?beta=true", + }: + raise BrokerPolicyError("endpoint forbidden") + allowed = { + "model", + "messages", + "system", + "tools", + "tool_choice", + "max_tokens", + "stream", + "temperature", + "top_p", + "top_k", + "thinking", + "output_config", + "metadata", + "stop_sequences", + "service_tier", + "context_management", + } + if set(data) - allowed: + raise BrokerPolicyError( + "unsupported fields: " + ",".join(sorted(set(data) - allowed)) + ) + tools = data.get("tools", []) + if not isinstance(tools, list): + raise BrokerPolicyError("tools must be a list") + for tool in tools: + if not isinstance(tool, dict) or tool.get("type", "custom") != "custom": + raise BrokerPolicyError("server-side tools are forbidden") + if set(tool) - { + "type", + "name", + "description", + "input_schema", + "cache_control", + "defer_loading", + "strict", + "input_examples", + }: + raise BrokerPolicyError("unsupported custom tool fields") + _schemas(tool) + _local_content(data.get("messages")) + _local_content(data.get("system")) + context = data.get("context_management", {}) + if not isinstance(context, dict) or set(context) - {"edits"}: + raise BrokerPolicyError("unsupported context management") + for edit in context.get("edits", []): + if not isinstance(edit, dict) or edit.get("type") not in { + "clear_thinking_20251015", + "clear_tool_uses_20250919", + }: + raise BrokerPolicyError("unsupported context operation") + else: + raise BrokerPolicyError("unsupported protocol") + if not isinstance(data.get("model"), str) or not data["model"]: + raise BrokerPolicyError("model required") + return data + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class BrokerUpstream: + """Trusted upstream selection; never populated from a container request.""" + + protocol: str + host: str + base_path: str + headers: dict[str, str] = field(repr=False) + chatgpt: bool = False + + +def load_broker_upstream(backend: str) -> BrokerUpstream: + """Load credentials on the host without copying them into the container.""" + if backend == "codex": + key = os.environ.get("CODEX_API_KEY") + if key: + return BrokerUpstream( + "responses", OPENAI_API_HOST, "/v1", {"Authorization": "Bearer " + key} + ) + auth = json.loads((host_codex_home() / "auth.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")) + if auth.get("auth_mode") == "chatgpt": + tokens = auth["tokens"] + return BrokerUpstream( + "responses", + CODEX_CHATGPT_HOST, + "/backend-api/codex", + { + "Authorization": "Bearer " + tokens["access_token"], + "ChatGPT-Account-ID": tokens["account_id"], + "OpenAI-Beta": "responses=experimental", + "originator": "codex_cli_rs", + }, + chatgpt=True, + ) + key = auth.get("OPENAI_API_KEY") or os.environ.get("OPENAI_API_KEY") + if key: + return BrokerUpstream( + "responses", OPENAI_API_HOST, "/v1", {"Authorization": "Bearer " + key} + ) + raise RuntimeError("No supported Codex credentials for the isolated broker") + if backend == "claude": + token = os.environ.get("CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN") + key = os.environ.get("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY") + if not token and not key: + creds = json.loads( + (host_claude_config_dir() / ".credentials.json").read_text( + encoding="utf-8" + ) + ) + token = creds.get("claudeAiOauth", {}).get("accessToken") + headers = {"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01"} + if token: + headers.update( + { + "Authorization": "Bearer " + token, + "anthropic-beta": "oauth-2025-04-20,context-management-2025-06-27", + } + ) + elif key: + headers["x-api-key"] = key + else: + raise RuntimeError("No Claude credentials for the isolated broker") + return BrokerUpstream("messages", ANTHROPIC_API_HOST, "/v1", headers) + raise RuntimeError( + f"Isolated Apptainer model transport does not support {backend!r}; " + "refusing host networking" + ) + + +class _Server(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, socketserver.UnixStreamServer): + daemon_threads = True + block_on_close = False + + def __init__(self, path: Path, provider: BrokerUpstream, log_path: Path): + self.provider = provider + self.log_path = log_path + self.log_lock = threading.Lock() + super().__init__(str(path), _Handler) + + def record(self, path: str, status: int, reason: str) -> None: + """Retain decisions, never credentials or request/response bodies.""" + with self.log_lock, self.log_path.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as log: + log.write( + json.dumps({"path": path[:200], "status": status, "reason": reason}) + + "\n" + ) + + +class _Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): + server: _Server + close_connection: bool + protocol_version = "HTTP/1.0" # one framed request per connection + + def setup(self) -> None: + self.request.settimeout(120) + super().setup() + + def log_message( # pylint: disable=redefined-builtin + self, format: str, *args: Any + ) -> None: + """Suppress the standard HTTP logger; use body-free policy audit records.""" + + def _reject(self, status: int, reason: str) -> None: + self.server.record(self.path, status, reason) + body = json.dumps( + { + "error": { + "message": "Robocode broker: " + reason, + "type": "broker_policy", + } + } + ).encode() + self.send_response(status) + self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json") + self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body))) + self.end_headers() + self.wfile.write(body) + self.close_connection = True + + def do_CONNECT(self) -> None: # pylint: disable=invalid-name + """Never expose a TCP tunnel.""" + self._reject(403, "CONNECT forbidden") + + def do_GET(self) -> None: # pylint: disable=invalid-name + """Do not expose discovery, search, retrieval, or websocket upgrades.""" + self._reject(403, "GET and websocket upgrades forbidden") + + def do_POST(self) -> None: # pylint: disable=invalid-name + """Validate, authenticate on the host, and stream a fixed upstream.""" + try: + lengths = self.headers.get_all("Content-Length", []) + if ( + len(lengths) != 1 + or not lengths[0].isascii() + or not lengths[0].isdigit() + ): + raise BrokerPolicyError("single Content-Length required") + length = int(lengths[0]) + if not 0 < length <= MAX_BODY: + raise BrokerPolicyError("invalid body size") + if self.headers.get("Transfer-Encoding") or self.headers.get("Upgrade"): + raise BrokerPolicyError("transfer encoding and upgrades forbidden") + if self.headers.get("Content-Encoding", "identity") != "identity": + raise BrokerPolicyError("compressed requests unsupported") + raw = self.rfile.read(length) + if len(raw) != length: + raise BrokerPolicyError("incomplete body") + provider = self.server.provider + data = validate_request(provider.protocol, self.path, raw) + # The ChatGPT Codex endpoint only accepts streaming, unstored inference. + if provider.protocol == "responses": + data["store"] = False + if provider.chatgpt: + if self.path == "/v1/responses": + data["stream"] = True + raw = json.dumps(data, allow_nan=False).encode() + except ( + BrokerPolicyError, + ValueError, + RecursionError, + TypeError, + AttributeError, + ) as exc: + self._reject(403, str(exc)) + return + headers = { + "Content-Type": "application/json", + "Accept": "text/event-stream", + **provider.headers, + } + conn = http.client.HTTPSConnection( + provider.host, timeout=120, context=ssl.create_default_context() + ) + started = False + try: + conn.request( + "POST", + provider.base_path + self.path[len("/v1") :], + body=raw, + headers=headers, + ) + response = conn.getresponse() + if 300 <= response.status < 400: + self._reject(502, "upstream redirect forbidden") + return + self.server.record(self.path, response.status, "forwarded") + self.send_response(response.status) + self.send_header( + "Content-Type", response.getheader("Content-Type", "application/json") + ) + self.send_header("Connection", "close") + self.end_headers() + started = True + while chunk := response.read1(65536): + self.wfile.write(chunk) + self.wfile.flush() + except (OSError, http.client.HTTPException): + if not started: + self._reject(502, "upstream unavailable") + finally: + conn.close() + self.close_connection = True + + +@contextmanager +def model_broker( + directory: Path, provider: BrokerUpstream, log_path: Path +) -> Iterator[Path]: + """Expose only the per-run Unix endpoint; the private log stays outside binds.""" + log_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + path = directory / "model.sock" + with _Server(path, provider, log_path) as server: + path.chmod(0o600) + thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True) + thread.start() + try: + yield path + finally: + server.shutdown() + thread.join(timeout=5) + path.unlink(missing_ok=True) diff --git a/tests/approaches/test_llm_genplan_approach.py b/tests/approaches/test_llm_genplan_approach.py index fb4d1573..50de68ca 100644 --- a/tests/approaches/test_llm_genplan_approach.py +++ b/tests/approaches/test_llm_genplan_approach.py @@ -600,3 +600,19 @@ def test_generalized_source_includes_underlying_mechanics(module_name, class_nam assert Path(path).read_text(encoding="utf-8") in source finally: env.close() + + +def test_apptainer_rejected_before_generation(tmp_path): + """An unsupported transport is a configuration error, never a host fallback.""" + env = _ToyEnv() + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="does not support the isolated Apptainer"): + LLMGenPlanApproach( + action_space=env.action_space, + observation_space=env.observation_space, + seed=0, + primitives={}, + completion=DictConfig({"provider": "cli"}), + container_backend="apptainer", + output_dir=str(tmp_path), + ) + assert not list(tmp_path.iterdir()) diff --git a/tests/utils/test_apptainer_sandbox.py b/tests/utils/test_apptainer_sandbox.py index d079881d..afa827f9 100644 --- a/tests/utils/test_apptainer_sandbox.py +++ b/tests/utils/test_apptainer_sandbox.py @@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ """ import asyncio +import json import subprocess -from contextlib import nullcontext from pathlib import Path import pytest @@ -18,18 +18,18 @@ from robocode.utils.apptainer_sandbox import ( APPTAINER_PYTHON, ApptainerSandboxConfig, - _build_apptainer_auth_args, _build_apptainer_cmd, + _isolated_transport, run_agent_in_apptainer_sandbox, - run_genplan_in_apptainer, sif_path_for, ) from robocode.utils.backends import create_backend from robocode.utils.docker_sandbox import ( DOCKER_PYTHON, - GENPLAN_CONTAINER_TIMEOUT_S, _find_repo_root, ) +from robocode.utils.isolated_transport import UnixRelay +from robocode.utils.model_broker import BrokerUpstream from robocode.utils.strict_blackbox import ( STRICT_BLACKBOX_PYTHON, ) @@ -81,8 +81,6 @@ def test_build_cmd_strict_has_no_project_mounts(tmp_path: Path) -> None: src_abs=None, kindergarden_abs=None, kinder_baselines_abs=None, - auth_args=[], - firewall_domains=[], agent_cmd=["claude"], ) joined = " ".join(cmd) @@ -90,7 +88,7 @@ def test_build_cmd_strict_has_no_project_mounts(tmp_path: Path) -> None: assert str(config.sif_path) not in cmd assert "/host/sandbox:/sandbox" in cmd assert "--containall" in cmd - assert "ROBOCODE_SKIP_FIREWALL=1" in cmd + assert not any("ROBOCODE_SKIP_FIREWALL" in arg for arg in cmd) assert "/robocode/src" not in joined assert "kindergarden" not in joined assert "ss-pybullet" not in joined @@ -104,10 +102,14 @@ class _Launched(Exception): def test_strict_run_uses_only_clean_interpreter( # type: ignore tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch ) -> None: - """The agent's scripts use the strict venv and the render proxy its own.""" + """Agent scripts and render tools share only the strict numerical dependencies.""" strict_sif_path = tmp_path / "robocode-strict-blackbox.sif" strict_sif_path.touch() sandbox_dir = tmp_path / "run" / "sandbox" + metadata_path = tmp_path / "env_spaces.json" + metadata_path.write_text( + json.dumps({"host": "attacker.invalid", "port": 9999}), encoding="utf-8" + ) config = ApptainerSandboxConfig( sandbox_dir=sandbox_dir, sif_path=tmp_path / "robocode-sandbox.sif", @@ -117,17 +119,30 @@ def test_strict_run_uses_only_clean_interpreter( # type: ignore mcp_tools=("render_state",), prompt="hello", output_filename="approach.py", + env_server_port=12345, + init_files={"env_spaces.json": metadata_path}, ) monkeypatch.setattr( - "robocode.utils.apptainer_sandbox._build_apptainer_auth_args", - lambda _backend: nullcontext(([], {})), + "robocode.utils.apptainer_sandbox.load_broker_upstream", + lambda _: BrokerUpstream("messages", "api.anthropic.com", "/v1", {}), ) + targets: list[tuple[str, int]] = [] + + def capture_relay(path: str, target: tuple[str, int]) -> UnixRelay: + targets.append(target) + return UnixRelay(path, target) + + monkeypatch.setattr("robocode.utils.apptainer_sandbox.UnixRelay", capture_relay) + monkeypatch.setenv("CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", "host-only-test-secret") launched: list[list[str]] = [] real_popen = subprocess.Popen def fake_popen(cmd: list[str], **kwargs): # type: ignore if cmd[0] != "apptainer": # the sandbox's own git commands return real_popen(cmd, **kwargs) + assert kwargs["start_new_session"] is True + assert "host-only-test-secret" not in str(kwargs) + assert ".credentials.json" not in " ".join(cmd) launched.append(cmd) raise _Launched @@ -136,13 +151,16 @@ def fake_popen(cmd: list[str], **kwargs): # type: ignore with pytest.raises(_Launched): asyncio.run(run_agent_in_apptainer_sandbox(config, backend)) + assert targets == [("127.0.0.1", 12345)] + metadata = json.loads((sandbox_dir / "env_spaces.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")) + assert (metadata["host"], metadata["port"]) == ("127.0.0.1", 18081) assert len(launched) == 1 cmd = launched[0] joined = " ".join(cmd) assert str(strict_sif_path) in cmd assert "/robocode/src" not in joined - # The render-server probe and CLAUDE.md name the strict interpreter; the MCP - # start script the render proxy's separate one. + # Agent scripts, the render server, and the startup probe use the same + # dependency-clean interpreter. assert f"{STRICT_BLACKBOX_PYTHON} -c" in joined assert STRICT_BLACKBOX_PYTHON in (sandbox_dir / "CLAUDE.md").read_text() start_script = (sandbox_dir / ".mcp" / MCP_START_SCRIPT).read_text() @@ -167,8 +185,6 @@ def test_build_cmd_basic_shape(tmp_path: Path) -> None: src_abs="/host/src", kindergarden_abs="/host/kindergarden", kinder_baselines_abs=None, - auth_args=[], - firewall_domains=[], agent_cmd=["claude", "--print", "hello"], ) @@ -188,8 +204,8 @@ def test_build_cmd_basic_shape(tmp_path: Path) -> None: # Env vars are passed as `--env KEY=val` pairs. assert "CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS=8192" in cmd assert "CLAUDE_AUTOCOMPACT_PCT_OVERRIDE=70" in cmd - # init-firewall.sh is skipped (apptainer can't grant CAP_NET_ADMIN). - assert "ROBOCODE_SKIP_FIREWALL=1" in cmd + # Apptainer uses the isolated namespace, not the Docker firewall entrypoint. + assert not any("ROBOCODE_SKIP_FIREWALL" in arg for arg in cmd) # Headless container has no GPU: mujoco's Dynamic3D renderer must use OSMesa # (software), so the sandbox forces it; EGL device displays would crash. assert "MUJOCO_GL=osmesa" in cmd @@ -202,7 +218,11 @@ def test_build_cmd_basic_shape(tmp_path: Path) -> None: # SIF path appears before the entrypoint invocation. sif_idx = cmd.index(str(config.sif_path)) - entrypoint_idx = cmd.index("/usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh") + entrypoint_idx = cmd.index("/usr/bin/setpriv") + assert "--net" in cmd + assert cmd[cmd.index("--network") + 1] == "none" + assert "--userns" in cmd + assert "/usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh" not in cmd assert sif_idx < entrypoint_idx # Agent command is appended at the end. @@ -210,7 +230,7 @@ def test_build_cmd_basic_shape(tmp_path: Path) -> None: def test_build_cmd_bilevel_conditional(tmp_path: Path) -> None: - """The kinder-baselines bind and --extra bilevel sync appear only when requested.""" + """Bilevel source is conditional; dependency installation is a separate phase.""" def build(kinder_baselines_abs: str | None) -> list[str]: return _build_apptainer_cmd( @@ -219,8 +239,6 @@ def build(kinder_baselines_abs: str | None) -> list[str]: src_abs="/host/src", kindergarden_abs="/host/kindergarden", kinder_baselines_abs=kinder_baselines_abs, - auth_args=[], - firewall_domains=[], agent_cmd=["claude"], ) @@ -230,7 +248,7 @@ def build(kinder_baselines_abs: str | None) -> list[str]: on = build("/host/kinder-baselines") assert "/host/kinder-baselines:/robocode/third-party/kinder-baselines" in on - assert "ROBOCODE_UV_EXTRA_ARGS=--extra bilevel" in on + assert not any("ROBOCODE_UV_EXTRA_ARGS" in arg for arg in on) def test_build_cmd_always_adds_containall(tmp_path: Path) -> None: @@ -247,8 +265,6 @@ def test_build_cmd_always_adds_containall(tmp_path: Path) -> None: src_abs="/host/src", kindergarden_abs="/host/kindergarden", kinder_baselines_abs=None, - auth_args=[], - firewall_domains=[], agent_cmd=["claude"], ) default_cmd = _build_apptainer_cmd( @@ -257,8 +273,6 @@ def test_build_cmd_always_adds_containall(tmp_path: Path) -> None: src_abs="/host/src", kindergarden_abs="/host/kindergarden", kinder_baselines_abs=None, - auth_args=[], - firewall_domains=[], agent_cmd=["claude"], ) assert "--containall" in blackbox_cmd @@ -268,154 +282,29 @@ def test_build_cmd_always_adds_containall(tmp_path: Path) -> None: assert "--pid" in default_cmd -def test_genplan_cmd_adds_containall( - tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch # type: ignore -) -> None: - """GenPlan gets the same default-bind isolation as the agentic path.""" - sandbox_dir = tmp_path / "sandbox" - sandbox_dir.mkdir() - sif_path = tmp_path / "robocode-sandbox.sif" - sif_path.touch() - filtered_src = tmp_path / "src" - filtered_kindergarden = tmp_path / "kindergarden" - filtered_src.mkdir() - filtered_kindergarden.mkdir() - - monkeypatch.setattr( - "robocode.utils.apptainer_sandbox._filtered_repo_mounts", - lambda **_kwargs: nullcontext( - (filtered_src, filtered_kindergarden, None, None) - ), +def test_metadata_cannot_select_an_environment_destination(tmp_path: Path) -> None: + """Only the explicit host config can authorize a relay, including on resume.""" + (tmp_path / "env_spaces.json").write_text( + json.dumps({"host": "127.0.0.1", "port": 9999}), encoding="utf-8" ) - monkeypatch.setattr( - "robocode.utils.apptainer_sandbox._build_apptainer_auth_args", - lambda _backend: nullcontext(([], {})), + config = ApptainerSandboxConfig(sandbox_dir=tmp_path) + upstream = BrokerUpstream("messages", "api.anthropic.com", "/v1", {}) + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="explicit trusted env_server_port"): + with _isolated_transport(config, upstream): + pytest.fail("Untrusted metadata enabled a host relay") + + +def test_unsupported_backend_never_sets_up_an_agent(tmp_path, monkeypatch) -> None: + """Removing the old OpenCode auth path cannot cause an unbrokered fallback.""" + image = tmp_path / "image.sif" + image.touch() + config = ApptainerSandboxConfig(sandbox_dir=tmp_path / "sandbox", sif_path=image) + backend = create_backend( + DictConfig({"backend": "opencode", "model": "openai/test"}) ) monkeypatch.setattr( - "robocode.utils.apptainer_sandbox.firewall_domains_for_provider", - lambda *_args: [], + "robocode.utils.apptainer_sandbox._setup_sandbox_dir", + lambda _: pytest.fail("Unsupported backend reached agent setup"), ) - calls: list[list[str]] = [] - - timeouts: list[float] = [] - - def fake_run(cmd: list[str], **kwargs) -> None: - calls.append(cmd) - timeouts.append(kwargs["timeout"]) - - monkeypatch.setattr("robocode.utils.apptainer_sandbox.subprocess.run", fake_run) - - run_genplan_in_apptainer( - sandbox_dir, - {"provider": "cli"}, - sif_path=sif_path, - ) - - assert len(calls) == 1 - assert timeouts == [GENPLAN_CONTAINER_TIMEOUT_S] - assert calls[0][:3] == ["apptainer", "exec", "--containall"] - assert "--pid" in calls[0] - - -def test_build_cmd_firewall_domains(tmp_path: Path) -> None: - """Firewall domains, when present, are forwarded via --env.""" - config = ApptainerSandboxConfig(sandbox_dir=tmp_path / "sandbox") - cmd = _build_apptainer_cmd( - config, - sandbox_abs="/host/sandbox", - src_abs="/host/src", - kindergarden_abs="/host/kindergarden", - kinder_baselines_abs=None, - auth_args=[], - firewall_domains=["api.example.com", "cdn.example.com"], - agent_cmd=["claude"], - ) - assert "ROBOCODE_FIREWALL_EXTRA_DOMAINS=api.example.com,cdn.example.com" in cmd - - -def test_build_cmd_no_firewall_when_empty(tmp_path: Path) -> None: - """When no extra domains are requested, the env var is not added.""" - config = ApptainerSandboxConfig(sandbox_dir=tmp_path / "sandbox") - cmd = _build_apptainer_cmd( - config, - sandbox_abs="/host/sandbox", - src_abs="/host/src", - kindergarden_abs="/host/kindergarden", - kinder_baselines_abs=None, - auth_args=[], - firewall_domains=[], - agent_cmd=["claude"], - ) - assert not any("ROBOCODE_FIREWALL_EXTRA_DOMAINS" in arg for arg in cmd) - - -def test_build_cmd_auth_args_inserted(tmp_path: Path) -> None: - """Caller-supplied auth args (e.g. a --bind) appear in the cmd.""" - config = ApptainerSandboxConfig(sandbox_dir=tmp_path / "sandbox") - auth_args = ["--bind", "/home/u/.claude:/home/node/.claude"] - cmd = _build_apptainer_cmd( - config, - sandbox_abs="/host/sandbox", - src_abs="/host/src", - kindergarden_abs="/host/kindergarden", - kinder_baselines_abs=None, - auth_args=auth_args, - firewall_domains=[], - agent_cmd=["claude"], - ) - assert "/home/u/.claude:/home/node/.claude" in cmd - - -def test_opencode_auth_passes_api_keys(monkeypatch) -> None: # type: ignore - """Provider API keys are forwarded via APPTAINERENV_ env vars, not argv.""" - monkeypatch.setenv("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "sk-test-value") - with _build_apptainer_auth_args("opencode") as (args, env): - assert env.get("APPTAINERENV_ANTHROPIC_API_KEY") == "sk-test-value" - # The secret must not appear on the command line. - assert not any("sk-test-value" in a for a in args) - - -def test_codex_auth_passes_codex_api_key(monkeypatch) -> None: # type: ignore - """Forward the Codex key through the container environment.""" - monkeypatch.setenv("CODEX_API_KEY", "sk-test-value") - - with _build_apptainer_auth_args("codex") as (args, env): - assert not args - assert env == {"APPTAINERENV_CODEX_API_KEY": "sk-test-value"} - - -def test_claude_auth_uses_env_token(monkeypatch) -> None: # type: ignore - """CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN is forwarded via APPTAINERENV_, never on argv.""" - monkeypatch.setenv("CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", "sk-ant-oat01-test") - with _build_apptainer_auth_args("claude") as (args, env): - assert env.get("APPTAINERENV_CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN") == "sk-ant-oat01-test" - # The token must not appear on the command line (visible via `ps`). - assert not any("sk-ant-oat01-test" in a for a in args) - assert not any("--bind" in a for a in args) - - -def test_claude_auth_binds_credentials_only( # type: ignore - tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch -) -> None: - """The fallback mount is a throwaway credentials-only copy.""" - monkeypatch.delenv("CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", raising=False) - # Force the resolver to report no token (avoid Keychain hit on dev macOS). - monkeypatch.setattr( - "robocode.utils.apptainer_sandbox._get_claude_oauth_token", - lambda: None, - ) - host = tmp_path / ".claude" - (host / "projects").mkdir(parents=True) - (host / "projects" / "past.jsonl").write_text("past") - (host / ".credentials.json").write_text("credentials") - monkeypatch.setenv("CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR", str(host)) - - with _build_apptainer_auth_args("claude") as (args, env): - assert not env - bind = next(arg for arg in args if arg.endswith(":/home/node/.claude")) - mounted = Path(bind.split(":", 1)[0]) - assert mounted != host - assert [path.name for path in mounted.iterdir()] == [".credentials.json"] - copied = mounted - - assert not copied.exists() + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="does not support 'opencode'"): + asyncio.run(run_agent_in_apptainer_sandbox(config, backend)) diff --git a/tests/utils/test_backends.py b/tests/utils/test_backends.py index 3338e8d5..30d16979 100644 --- a/tests/utils/test_backends.py +++ b/tests/utils/test_backends.py @@ -818,6 +818,11 @@ def test_provider_from_model_no_slash(self) -> None: def test_firewall_domains_for_known_providers(self) -> None: """Known providers return their API domains.""" + assert firewall_domains_for_provider("codex") == [ + "api.openai.com", + "chatgpt.com", + "ab.chatgpt.com", + ] assert firewall_domains_for_provider("openai") == ["api.openai.com"] assert firewall_domains_for_provider("anthropic") == ["api.anthropic.com"] assert firewall_domains_for_provider("google") == [ diff --git a/tests/utils/test_isolated_transport.py b/tests/utils/test_isolated_transport.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4046960c --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/utils/test_isolated_transport.py @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +"""The agent must never start when namespace setup or privilege dropping fails.""" + +# pylint: disable=redefined-outer-name + +import pytest + +from robocode.utils.apptainer_environment import clean_apptainer_env +from robocode.utils.isolated_transport import verify_namespace, verify_strict_runtime + + +@pytest.fixture +def namespace(monkeypatch): + """Provide a kernel snapshot that models the required private namespace.""" + state = { + "uid": 1013, + "interfaces": [(1, "lo")], + "route": "header\n", + "caps": "0", + "nnp": "1", + } + monkeypatch.setattr( + "robocode.utils.isolated_transport.os.getuid", lambda: state["uid"] + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + "robocode.utils.isolated_transport.socket.if_nameindex", + lambda: state["interfaces"], + ) + + def read(path, **_kwargs): + if str(path) == "/proc/net/route": + return state["route"] + return ( + "\n".join( + f"{key}: {state['caps']}" + for key in ("CapEff", "CapPrm", "CapBnd", "CapInh", "CapAmb") + ) + + f"\nNoNewPrivs: {state['nnp']}\n" + ) + + monkeypatch.setattr("robocode.utils.isolated_transport.Path.read_text", read) + return state + + +@pytest.mark.usefixtures("namespace") +def test_private_namespace_passes(): + """The required kernel state allows the supervisor to proceed.""" + verify_namespace() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "key,value", + [ + ("uid", 0), + ("interfaces", [(1, "lo"), (2, "eth0")]), + ("route", "header\nroute\n"), + ("caps", "1000"), + ("nnp", "0"), + ], +) +def test_bad_namespace_cannot_fall_back(namespace, key, value): + """A failed invariant aborts before any agent or relay is started.""" + namespace[key] = value + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError): + verify_namespace() + + +def test_child_environment_excludes_credentials_and_override_flags(monkeypatch): + """Host auth and Apptainer special variables cannot leak to the child.""" + for key in ( + "OPENAI_API_KEY", + "CODEX_API_KEY", + "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", + "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", + "APPTAINERENV_OPENAI_API_KEY", + "APPTAINER_BINDPATH", + "SINGULARITY_BINDPATH", + "HTTPS_PROXY", + "LD_PRELOAD", + ): + monkeypatch.setenv(key, "secret-or-override") + env = clean_apptainer_env() + assert "secret-or-override" not in env.values() + + +def test_strict_runtime_rejects_old_image(monkeypatch): + """The previous image cannot silently remain in use after upgrading the runner.""" + monkeypatch.setattr( + "pathlib.Path.exists", lambda self: str(self) == "/opt/robocode-mcp" + ) + with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="legacy MCP"): + verify_strict_runtime() diff --git a/tests/utils/test_model_broker.py b/tests/utils/test_model_broker.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b776a288 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/utils/test_model_broker.py @@ -0,0 +1,331 @@ +"""Adversarial policy and HTTP framing checks for the trusted inference broker.""" + +# pylint: disable=redefined-outer-name + +import http.client +import io +import json +import socket +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Any + +import pytest + +from robocode.utils.model_broker import ( + BrokerPolicyError, + BrokerUpstream, + load_broker_upstream, + model_broker, + validate_request, +) + + +def _body(**extra: Any) -> bytes: + return json.dumps({"model": "test-model", "input": "hello", **extra}).encode() + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "tool", + [ + "web_search", + "web_search_preview", + "file_search", + "mcp", + "code_interpreter", + "computer_use_preview", + "image_generation", + "tool_search", + "future_server_tool", + ], +) +def test_hosted_tools_rejected(tool): + """New or known provider-executed tools never reach the upstream API.""" + with pytest.raises(BrokerPolicyError): + validate_request("responses", "/v1/responses", _body(tools=[{"type": tool}])) + + +def test_nested_namespace_cannot_hide_hosted_tool(): + """Namespaces contain only client-executed function/custom declarations.""" + tools = [{"type": "namespace", "name": "a", "tools": [{"type": "web_search"}]}] + with pytest.raises(BrokerPolicyError): + validate_request("responses", "/v1/responses", _body(tools=tools)) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "path", + [ + "https://example.com/v1/responses", + "//example.com/v1/responses", + "/v1/models", + "/v1/responses?url=https://example.com", + "/v1/responses/../search", + "/v1/responses%2f..%2fsearch", + "/v1/files", + "/v1/responses/123", + ], +) +def test_only_exact_inference_paths_allowed(path): + """Absolute URLs, redirects, retrieval endpoints and encoded paths fail.""" + with pytest.raises(BrokerPolicyError): + validate_request("responses", path, _body()) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "content", + [ + {"type": "input_image", "image_url": "https://example.com/image.png"}, + {"type": "input_file", "file_url": "https://example.com/f"}, + {"type": "input_file", "file_id": "file-123"}, + {"source": {"type": "url", "url": "https://example.com"}}, + ], +) +def test_remote_content_retrieval_rejected(content): + """An inference endpoint cannot be used as a URL fetcher.""" + with pytest.raises(BrokerPolicyError): + validate_request("responses", "/v1/responses", _body(input=[content])) + + +def test_inline_image_and_literal_url_text_allowed(): + """Locally supplied pixels and ordinary URL mentions are not network fetches.""" + data = _body( + input=[ + { + "role": "user", + "content": [ + {"type": "input_text", "text": "https://example.com"}, + {"type": "input_image", "image_url": ""}, + ], + } + ], + tools=[{"type": "function", "name": "shell", "parameters": {"type": "object"}}], + ) + assert validate_request("responses", "/v1/responses", data)["model"] == "test-model" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "extra", + [ + {"tools": [{"type": "web_search_20250305", "name": "web_search"}]}, + {"tools": [{"type": "web_fetch_20250910", "name": "web_fetch"}]}, + {"mcp_servers": [{"url": "https://example.com"}]}, + {"container": {"skills": []}}, + { + "messages": [ + {"content": [{"source": {"type": "url", "url": "https://example.com"}}]} + ] + }, + ], +) +def test_claude_server_capabilities_rejected(extra): + """Only client-executed Claude tools and inline message content are allowed.""" + data = json.dumps({"model": "claude", "messages": [], **extra}).encode() + with pytest.raises(BrokerPolicyError): + validate_request("messages", "/v1/messages?beta=true", data) + + +def test_duplicate_keys_and_unknown_fields_fail_closed(): + """Neither ambiguous JSON nor future API switches can silently expand access.""" + for data in ( + b'{"model":"a","tools":[],"tools":[{"type":"web_search"}]}', + _body(new_network_feature=True), + ): + with pytest.raises(BrokerPolicyError): + validate_request("responses", "/v1/responses", data) + + +class _UnixHTTP(http.client.HTTPConnection): + def connect(self): + self.sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) + self.sock.settimeout(5) + self.sock.connect(self.host) + + +class _Response(io.BytesIO): + status = 200 + + def getheader(self, name, default=None): + """Return the minimal streaming response headers.""" + return "text/event-stream" if name == "Content-Type" else default + + +@pytest.fixture +def broker(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch): + """A real Unix HTTP server with a fake, observable HTTPS upstream.""" + requests = [] + response = _Response(b'data: {"ok":true}\n\n') + + class Connection: + """Record upstream operations without performing network I/O.""" + + def __init__(self, host, **kwargs): + assert host == "api.openai.com" + assert kwargs["context"].check_hostname + + def request(self, method, path, body, headers): + """Record exactly what would be sent to the provider.""" + requests.append((method, path, body, headers)) + + def getresponse(self): + """Return the fixture response.""" + return response + + def close(self): + """No real upstream connection needs closing.""" + + monkeypatch.setattr( + "robocode.utils.model_broker.http.client.HTTPSConnection", Connection + ) + provider = BrokerUpstream( + "responses", "api.openai.com", "/v1", {"Authorization": "Bearer host-secret"} + ) + with model_broker(tmp_path, provider, tmp_path / "audit.jsonl") as path: + yield path, requests, response + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "method,path,body,headers", + [ + ("CONNECT", "example.com:443", None, {}), + ("GET", "/v1/responses", None, {"Upgrade": "websocket"}), + ("POST", "/v1/responses", _body(), {"Content-Encoding": "gzip"}), + ("POST", "/v1/responses", _body(), {"Transfer-Encoding": "chunked"}), + ("POST", "/v1/responses", _body(tools=[{"type": "web_search"}]), {}), + ], +) +def test_http_denials_never_open_upstream(broker, method, path, body, headers): + """Framing, tunneling and tool bypasses are rejected before HTTPS starts.""" + address, requests, _ = broker + conn = _UnixHTTP(str(address)) + conn.request(method, path, body=body, headers=headers) + assert conn.getresponse().status == 403 + conn.close() + assert not requests + + +def test_valid_stream_uses_fixed_host_path_and_host_credentials(broker): + """An agent's Host, Authorization and forwarding headers carry no authority.""" + address, requests, _ = broker + conn = _UnixHTTP(str(address)) + conn.request( + "POST", + "/v1/responses", + body=_body(), + headers={ + "Host": "evil.invalid", + "Authorization": "Bearer attacker", + "X-Forwarded-Host": "evil.invalid", + }, + ) + response = conn.getresponse() + assert response.status == 200 + assert response.read() == b'data: {"ok":true}\n\n' + conn.close() + assert requests[0][0:2] == ("POST", "/v1/responses") + assert requests[0][3]["Authorization"] == "Bearer host-secret" + assert "X-Forwarded-Host" not in requests[0][3] + assert "host-secret" not in (address.parent / "audit.jsonl").read_text( + encoding="utf-8" + ) + + +def test_upstream_redirect_is_never_followed(broker): + """Even a redirect from the approved provider cannot change destination.""" + address, requests, upstream = broker + upstream.status = 302 + conn = _UnixHTTP(str(address)) + conn.request("POST", "/v1/responses", body=_body()) + assert conn.getresponse().status == 502 + conn.close() + assert len(requests) == 1 + + +def test_duplicate_content_length_rejected(broker): + """Conflicting framing cannot smuggle a second request to the provider.""" + address, requests, _ = broker + with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock: + sock.connect(str(address)) + sock.sendall( + b"POST /v1/responses HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: local\r\n" + b"Content-Length: 2\r\nContent-Length: 3\r\n\r\n{}" + ) + assert b"403" in sock.recv(4096) + assert not requests + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "content", + [ + {"type": "input_image", "image_url": ""}, + { + "type": "image", + "source": { + "type": "base64", + "media_type": "application/pdf", + "data": "AAAA", + }, + }, + {"type": "input_file", "file_data": "AAAA"}, + {"type": "mcp_approval_response", "approval_request_id": "x", "approve": True}, + ], +) +def test_indirect_document_and_server_operation_channels_rejected(content): + """Opaque document formats and inherited hosted operations stay unsupported.""" + with pytest.raises(BrokerPolicyError): + validate_request("responses", "/v1/responses", _body(input=[content])) + + +def test_cannot_inherit_tools_from_stored_response(): + """A caller cannot continue an unrelated stored response with hosted tools.""" + with pytest.raises(BrokerPolicyError): + validate_request( + "responses", "/v1/responses", _body(previous_response_id="resp_other") + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "backend,env_name,expected_host,header,prefix", + [ + ("codex", "CODEX_API_KEY", "api.openai.com", "Authorization", "Bearer "), + ( + "claude", + "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", + "api.anthropic.com", + "Authorization", + "Bearer ", + ), + ("claude", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "api.anthropic.com", "x-api-key", ""), + ], +) +def test_credentials_belong_to_host_upstream( + monkeypatch, backend, env_name, expected_host, header, prefix +): + """The broker resolves host auth without manufacturing a container auth mount.""" + for key in ("CODEX_API_KEY", "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"): + monkeypatch.delenv(key, raising=False) + monkeypatch.setenv(env_name, "host-only-test-secret") + upstream = load_broker_upstream(backend) + assert upstream.host == expected_host + assert upstream.headers[header] == prefix + "host-only-test-secret" + assert "host-only-test-secret" not in repr(upstream) + + +def test_codex_session_auth_stays_on_host(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + """ChatGPT account routing is loaded from host auth, not a container hint.""" + monkeypatch.delenv("CODEX_API_KEY", raising=False) + monkeypatch.setattr("robocode.utils.model_broker.host_codex_home", lambda: tmp_path) + (tmp_path / "auth.json").write_text( + json.dumps( + { + "auth_mode": "chatgpt", + "tokens": { + "access_token": "host-session-secret", + "account_id": "trusted-account", + }, + } + ), + encoding="utf-8", + ) + upstream = load_broker_upstream("codex") + assert (upstream.host, upstream.base_path) == ("chatgpt.com", "/backend-api/codex") + assert upstream.headers["ChatGPT-Account-ID"] == "trusted-account" + assert "host-session-secret" not in repr(upstream)