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Thanks for this — the record is careful work, and the call-count gating detail is a genuinely useful thing to have in the index. Two things, one of them my fault. 1. The next free id is Happy to do the renumber and rebase for you if you'd rather not — say the word and I'll push it to your branch, or open a follow-up that does it, whichever you prefer. Only asking first because it's your branch. I'm also adding a guard so this can't recur: a validator check that fails on duplicate incident ids, plus a 2. Triage verdict: it qualifies. I checked it against One thing worth a second look while you're rebasing: the record sets Nothing else blocks this from my side. |
Pillar Security's Deadbugz disclosure: a malicious MCP server serves its documented, benign tool contract for the first two tool calls in a session, then substitutes credential-harvesting instructions on the third call. A connect-and-check review never crosses the threshold, so this is invisible to single-session auditing by construction. Renumbered from INC-132 to INC-136: GenAI-Security-Project#117 claimed 132-134 while this was open, GenAI-Security-Project#122 (open) claims 135. Category is research-demonstrated, not real-world: the schema defines real-world as a confirmed incident, and this entry's own impact field says no compromise was confirmed, 23 delivery PRs opened, none merged. INC-126 is the one other entry in the dataset with comparable unconfirmed-impact language and it carries the same category. Mapped to ASI01 (goal hijack), ASI02 (tool misuse), ASI04 (agentic supply chain). Source: https://www.pillar.security/blog/deadbugz-currently-active-mcp-supply-chain-campaign
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Thanks for catching both. Pushed a fix for each. Renumbered to INC-136 and rebuilt clean off current main. #117 and #122 both touch the same generated JSON/JS this schema regenerates, and a hand-resolved merge there risked corrupting it. Checked the free id against main directly: 001 through 134 contiguous, 135 claimed by your open #122, so 136 stays clear either way that one lands. On category, I went with your suggestion, research-demonstrated. Wanted to write down why it's right, since I checked it rather than took it on faith. The schema's own enum description defines real-world as a confirmed incident, and this entry's impact field says plainly that no compromise was confirmed, 23 delivery PRs, none merged. INC-126 is the only other entry in the dataset with comparable unconfirmed-impact language, and it already carries research-demonstrated. Three independent readings landing on the same answer is what convinced me. One small thing on your review: I couldn't find docs/TRIAGE_RULES.md anywhere in the repo, on main or any open PR. Not blocking anything here, the schema enum backs the same verdict on its own. Flagging in case it's sitting uncommitted somewhere on your end. |
Pillar Security's Deadbugz disclosure: a malicious MCP server serves
its documented, benign tool contract for the first two tool calls in
a session, then substitutes credential-harvesting instructions on the
third call. A connect-and-check review never crosses the threshold,
so this is invisible to single-session auditing by construction.
Mapped to ASI01 (goal hijack), ASI02 (tool misuse), ASI04 (agentic
supply chain). Delivery: 23 PRs from one account against unrelated
repos, none merged at time of disclosure.
Source: https://www.pillar.security/blog/deadbugz-currently-active-mcp-supply-chain-campaign