Use GitHub Security Advisories private vulnerability reporting to disclose security issues responsibly:
- Open https://github.com/Synforger/agent-template/security/advisories/new
- Fill in the affected version + reproduction + impact estimate
- Maintainer will acknowledge within 7 days
Do not file public Issues or PRs for security-relevant findings. Public discussion only after a fix has shipped and end users have had time to update.
If GitHub access is unavailable, reach @Synforger via the
contact channel listed in the repo's README.
| version | supported |
|---|---|
| main (= rolling release) | ✅ active |
| tagged releases (= v0.x) | |
| forks / mirrors | ❌ out of scope |
This is a personal project; there is no enterprise LTS. Security fixes
land on main and the next tagged release. Pin to a specific tag if
your environment requires reproducibility.
Template scaffold whose shell / Python scripts run locally on the deriving operator's machine with that operator's privileges — no network service, no secret storage. Main threats: supply-chain tampering of the scripts between clone and first run (mitigated by pinning a tag), and unsafe handling of operator-provided paths inside the tooling scripts.
- Authentication / authorization flaws (= when applicable)
- Sensitive data leakage (= secrets in logs / errors / responses)
- Path traversal / SSRF / SQLi / XSS / RCE in code paths the template's own scripts execute
- Personal-identifier leakage surfaced by
task audit:deep
- Issues in upstream dependencies that are already disclosed (= report those upstream; this repo will pick up the fix on next bump)
- Best-practice nudges with no concrete exploit path
- Vulnerabilities only reproducible with privileged local access
(=
sudo/ root) — those imply the threat model has already failed - Cosmetic / DoS-via-resource-exhaustion in dev-mode tools
The maintainer runs task audit:deep (= 11-source deep anonymity
audit via guard-dispatcher) at least every 6 months. Findings + resolutions are tracked here:
| date | findings | resolution |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-05 | (initial) | placeholders filled, no findings |
When a vulnerability originates in a transitive dependency, the disclosure goes to the upstream maintainer first. This repo only contains the integration layer; the offending logic lives elsewhere and should be patched there.