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Security: Synforger/agent-template

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Use GitHub Security Advisories private vulnerability reporting to disclose security issues responsibly:

  1. Open https://github.com/Synforger/agent-template/security/advisories/new
  2. Fill in the affected version + reproduction + impact estimate
  3. Maintainer will acknowledge within 7 days

Do not file public Issues or PRs for security-relevant findings. Public discussion only after a fix has shipped and end users have had time to update.

If GitHub access is unavailable, reach @Synforger via the contact channel listed in the repo's README.

Supported versions

version supported
main (= rolling release) ✅ active
tagged releases (= v0.x) ⚠️ best effort (= no formal LTS)
forks / mirrors ❌ out of scope

This is a personal project; there is no enterprise LTS. Security fixes land on main and the next tagged release. Pin to a specific tag if your environment requires reproducibility.

Threat model

Template scaffold whose shell / Python scripts run locally on the deriving operator's machine with that operator's privileges — no network service, no secret storage. Main threats: supply-chain tampering of the scripts between clone and first run (mitigated by pinning a tag), and unsafe handling of operator-provided paths inside the tooling scripts.

In scope

  • Authentication / authorization flaws (= when applicable)
  • Sensitive data leakage (= secrets in logs / errors / responses)
  • Path traversal / SSRF / SQLi / XSS / RCE in code paths the template's own scripts execute
  • Personal-identifier leakage surfaced by task audit:deep

Out of scope

  • Issues in upstream dependencies that are already disclosed (= report those upstream; this repo will pick up the fix on next bump)
  • Best-practice nudges with no concrete exploit path
  • Vulnerabilities only reproducible with privileged local access (= sudo / root) — those imply the threat model has already failed
  • Cosmetic / DoS-via-resource-exhaustion in dev-mode tools

Audit log

The maintainer runs task audit:deep (= 11-source deep anonymity audit via guard-dispatcher) at least every 6 months. Findings + resolutions are tracked here:

date findings resolution
2026-07-05 (initial) placeholders filled, no findings

Upstream redirect

When a vulnerability originates in a transitive dependency, the disclosure goes to the upstream maintainer first. This repo only contains the integration layer; the offending logic lives elsewhere and should be patched there.

There aren't any published security advisories