Please report vulnerabilities privately via GitHub Security Advisories rather than a public issue. You should hear back within a few days.

The main supply-chain surface is distribution: the curl | sh installer and its per-artifact .sha256 checksum sidecars, and the CLI's checksum verification of the downloaded sidebar wasm — the same code path behind zj-radar setup zellij --download and zj-radar run's first-use wasm fetch on a crates.io-installed CLI. Be aware the verification fails open by design: a missing .sha256 sidecar, or no local sha256 tool (sha256sum/shasum), downgrades to a warning and installs anyway, with TLS + GitHub release storage as the floor; only an actual digest mismatch aborts (crates/cli/src/setup/download.rs, scripts/install.sh). Reports about weaknesses in that path are especially welcome. There is no bug bounty.

Dependency advisories are monitored by a nightly cargo deny check advisories licenses sources CI job (config in deny.toml); a failure automatically files a tracking issue.

The zj_radar.status.v1 pipe has a local-session trust boundary: any process inside the Zellij session (or another plugin, via MessagePlugin) can forge payloads. The plugin treats them as untrusted display data — payloads over 64 KB are dropped whole, every text field is sanitized and truncated at parse time, and notification commands receive the text as argv, never spliced into a shell. What that cannot prevent: a local writer can always paint misleading status. That is inherent to the boundary, not a vulnerability.