fix(deploy): prevent command injection from angular.json in ng deploy - #3738
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herdiyana256 wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix(deploy): prevent command injection from angular.json in ng deploy#3738herdiyana256 wants to merge 1 commit into
herdiyana256 wants to merge 1 commit into
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The SSR->Cloud Functions deploy builder shelled out with values read verbatim
from the workspace angular.json. findPackageVersion built `${packageManager} list
${name}` for execSync, where packageManager comes from cli.packageManager and name
from each server.options.externalDependencies entry (both parsed with a raw
JSON.parse, so the Angular CLI's own validation never runs). deployToFunction
likewise ran `npm --prefix ${functionsOut} install`, with functionsOut derived
from the outputPath deploy option. A malicious or cloned Angular workspace could
therefore run arbitrary commands the moment a developer runs ng deploy.
Run the package manager and npm without a shell (execFileSync with argument
arrays), validate cli.packageManager against the supported set, reject
externalDependencies entries that are not plain package specifiers, and constrain
outputPath in the deploy schema. Adds unit tests for both validators.
armando-navarro
added
bump: patch
comp: schematics
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The SSR to Cloud Functions deploy builder shells out with values taken verbatim from the workspace
angular.json.findPackageVersionbuilds`${packageManager} list ${name}`and passes it toexecSync.packageManagercomes fromcli.packageManagerandnamefrom eacharchitect.<project>.server.options.externalDependenciesentry. Both are read with a rawJSON.parse(readFileSync('angular.json')), so the Angular CLI's ownpackageManagerenum validation never applies.deployToFunctionsimilarly runs`npm --prefix ${functionsOut} install`, wherefunctionsOutderives from theoutputPathdeploy option. Any of these lets a malicious or cloned Angular workspace execute arbitrary commands the moment a developer runsng deploy, for exampleexternalDependencies: ["x; <command> #"]. This is the same threat model as the recently addressed deploy argv-injection, on distinct sinks that fix did not cover.The fix runs the package manager and npm without a shell (
execFileSyncwith argument arrays), validatescli.packageManageragainst the supported set, rejectsexternalDependenciesentries that are not plain package specifiers, and constrainsoutputPathin the deploy schema as defence in depth. Unit tests cover both validators.npm run test:nodepasses (150 specs, 0 failures); lint and typecheck clean.