feat(platform-wallet): shield Platform credits to an external Orchard recipient - #4472
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… recipient The Type 15 shield builder (dpp build_shield_transition) has always taken an arbitrary recipient, but the wallet layer pinned it to the account's own default address, so hosts could not pay a third-party shielded address from Platform credits in one transition. - operations::shield takes Option<&PaymentAddress> recipient + a 36-byte memo. None keeps today's shield-to-self exactly (Shield/In activity, empty memo). Some(addr) builds the note for that address and records the live activity as Sent/Out with the recipient's raw-43 counterparty and the memo - the same classification the scan deriver produces for an OVK-recovered send to a non-own address, so restored history and the live row share one id (visible-cmx hashing is unchanged). - PlatformWallet::shielded_shield_from_account_to_recipient parses the raw-43 recipient like shielded_transfer_to and shares the existing selection/single-flight/preflight body with shield_from_account. - New additive FFI platform_wallet_manager_shielded_shield_to_recipient (wallet_id, shielded/payment account, recipient_raw_43, amount, memo_text, signer). The existing shield extern is untouched, so the JNI/Kotlin binding keeps compiling. - Swift SDK shieldedShieldToRecipient mirrors shieldedTransfer's memo and recipient handling with shieldedShield's signer keepalive. - Round-trip test: the built bundle's real output IVK-decrypts only for the recipient, never for the sender, and OVK-recovers for the sender with recipient and memo intact. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe wallet can shield funds from a Platform Payment account to an external Orchard recipient. The flow supports optional memos, validates recipient and input data, records external activity, and exposes the operation through Rust FFI and Swift. ChangesExternal recipient shielding
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to The new recipient-shield API can intermittently fail or crash if the signer is released while the asynchronous payment is still running. A guaranteed signer lifetime should be added before merging. Suggested reviewers: Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant PlatformWalletManager
participant FFI
participant PlatformWallet
participant ShieldOperation
PlatformWalletManager->>FFI: Pass wallet, recipient, amount, memo, and signer
FFI->>PlatformWallet: Call shielded_shield_from_account_to_recipient
PlatformWallet->>ShieldOperation: Execute shielding with recipient and memo
ShieldOperation-->>PlatformWallet: Return shield result
PlatformWallet-->>FFI: Map result
FFI-->>PlatformWalletManager: Return async result
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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App-side consumer: dashpay/dashwallet-ios#1057 (new |
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✅ Final review complete — no blockers (commit 766d4e4) |
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In
`@packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletManagerShieldedSync.swift`:
- Around line 773-775: Replace the bare signer references in shieldedShield and
shieldedTransfer with withExtendedLifetime, keeping the signer alive for the
entire detached worker-task execution through its awaited value. Ensure the
added lifetime scope closes before the task’s value is accessed, while
preserving the existing task behavior.
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packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/platform_wallet.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/shielded/operations.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/shielded/sync/shield_decrypt_tests.rspackages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletManagerShieldedSync.swift
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Preliminary review — Codex only
The recipient, memo, and OVK plumbing is sound, but the new Swift entry point can release its pass-unretained signer before the synchronous Rust FFI call finishes, creating an in-scope use-after-free boundary. The Rust change also breaks a public free-function signature, misclassifies wallet-owned recipients, and lacks coverage of the newly added wallet/activity path.
Source: Codex general, security-auditor, rust-quality, and ffi-engineer reviewers — gpt-5.6-sol; final verifier — gpt-5.6-sol; orchestration-only, not reviewer evidence — openclaw-agent/cliproxy/gpt-5.6-sol.
Validated blockers were found in the Codex precheck. Opus is deferred until a fresh Codex revalidation clears the blocker gate.
Review provenance
- Codex reviewers:
gpt-5.6-sol— general (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— security-auditor (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— rust-quality (completed),gpt-5.6-sol— ffi-engineer (completed) - Verifier:
gpt-5.6-sol— verifier - Sonnet: not run (deferred by blocker gate)
🔴 1 blocking | 🟡 3 suggestion(s)
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These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletManagerShieldedSync.swift`:
- [BLOCKING] packages/swift-sdk/Sources/SwiftDashSDK/PlatformWallet/PlatformWalletManagerShieldedSync.swift:773-806: Pin the signer across the entire detached FFI call
`KeychainSigner` registers `self` as an `Unmanaged.passUnretained` callback context and destroys the Rust signer handle from `deinit`. The standalone `_ = addressSigner` is only a last use; optimized ARC may release the object before the subsequent FFI call completes. Rust re-materializes the raw handle as `&VTableSigner` inside its synchronously awaited proof worker and may invoke the Swift callback through it, so an operation-local signer can be deallocated while Rust still holds or uses the pointer. Wrap the complete marshalling and FFI call in `withExtendedLifetime(addressSigner)`.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/shielded/operations.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/shielded/operations.rs:459-471: Preserve the existing public shield Rust API
`wallet::shielded` and its `operations` module are public, making this `pub async fn shield` reachable by downstream Rust consumers even though it is not re-exported at the crate root. Adding mandatory `recipient` and `memo` parameters therefore breaks existing callers, contrary to the PR's additive/no-breaking-change contract. Keep the previous signature as a wrapper that supplies the default recipient and empty memo, and expose the new behavior through a separately named function or private implementation helper.
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/shielded/operations.rs:473-479: Do not infer an external recipient from Option::Some
A valid `PaymentAddress` passed through the new recipient API can belong to the selected shielded account, including a diversified address. This branch classifies every `Some` value as `Sent/Out`, while restoration tests ownership with `incoming_viewing_key.diversifier_index` and classifies an own output as incoming or a self-transfer. That makes live and restored activity semantics diverge for an input the public raw-address API currently accepts. Enforce the method's documented third-party invariant by rejecting addresses recognized by the source account and directing callers to the self-shield API.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/shielded/sync/shield_decrypt_tests.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/shielded/sync/shield_decrypt_tests.rs:183-199: Exercise the new live-activity branch in tests
The new test invokes the pre-existing `build_shield_transition` primitive directly, so it does not exercise this PR's wallet or `operations::shield` changes. It would still pass if the wallet ignored the recipient, dropped the memo before calling the builder, or recorded the external payment as `Shield/In`. Add focused coverage through the new wallet path, or extract its activity-parameter preparation into a pure helper, and assert recipient and memo forwarding plus `Sent/Out`, raw-43 counterparty, and live-versus-scan activity-ID alignment.
| try await Task.detached(priority: .userInitiated) { | ||
| // Keepalive — same rationale as `shieldedShield`. | ||
| _ = addressSigner | ||
|
|
||
| try walletId.withUnsafeBytes { widRaw in | ||
| guard let widPtr = widRaw.baseAddress?.assumingMemoryBound(to: UInt8.self) | ||
| else { | ||
| throw PlatformWalletError.invalidParameter("walletId baseAddress is nil") | ||
| } | ||
| try recipientRaw43.withUnsafeBytes { recipientRaw in | ||
| guard let recipientPtr = recipientRaw.baseAddress? | ||
| .assumingMemoryBound(to: UInt8.self) | ||
| else { | ||
| throw PlatformWalletError.invalidParameter( | ||
| "recipient baseAddress is nil" | ||
| ) | ||
| } | ||
| // `nil` / empty → null pointer (no memo); otherwise | ||
| // pass the text as a C string — Rust validates the | ||
| // 32-byte limit and does the 36-byte encoding. | ||
| let send: (UnsafePointer<CChar>?) throws -> Void = { memoCStr in | ||
| try platform_wallet_manager_shielded_shield_to_recipient( | ||
| handle, widPtr, shieldedAccount, paymentAccount, | ||
| recipientPtr, amount, memoCStr, signerHandle | ||
| ).check() | ||
| } | ||
| if let memo, !memo.isEmpty { | ||
| try memo.withCString { try send($0) } | ||
| } else { | ||
| try send(nil) | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| }.value |
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🔴 Blocking: Pin the signer across the entire detached FFI call
KeychainSigner registers self as an Unmanaged.passUnretained callback context and destroys the Rust signer handle from deinit. The standalone _ = addressSigner is only a last use; optimized ARC may release the object before the subsequent FFI call completes. Rust re-materializes the raw handle as &VTableSigner inside its synchronously awaited proof worker and may invoke the Swift callback through it, so an operation-local signer can be deallocated while Rust still holds or uses the pointer. Wrap the complete marshalling and FFI call in withExtendedLifetime(addressSigner).
| try await Task.detached(priority: .userInitiated) { | |
| // Keepalive — same rationale as `shieldedShield`. | |
| _ = addressSigner | |
| try walletId.withUnsafeBytes { widRaw in | |
| guard let widPtr = widRaw.baseAddress?.assumingMemoryBound(to: UInt8.self) | |
| else { | |
| throw PlatformWalletError.invalidParameter("walletId baseAddress is nil") | |
| } | |
| try recipientRaw43.withUnsafeBytes { recipientRaw in | |
| guard let recipientPtr = recipientRaw.baseAddress? | |
| .assumingMemoryBound(to: UInt8.self) | |
| else { | |
| throw PlatformWalletError.invalidParameter( | |
| "recipient baseAddress is nil" | |
| ) | |
| } | |
| // `nil` / empty → null pointer (no memo); otherwise | |
| // pass the text as a C string — Rust validates the | |
| // 32-byte limit and does the 36-byte encoding. | |
| let send: (UnsafePointer<CChar>?) throws -> Void = { memoCStr in | |
| try platform_wallet_manager_shielded_shield_to_recipient( | |
| handle, widPtr, shieldedAccount, paymentAccount, | |
| recipientPtr, amount, memoCStr, signerHandle | |
| ).check() | |
| } | |
| if let memo, !memo.isEmpty { | |
| try memo.withCString { try send($0) } | |
| } else { | |
| try send(nil) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| }.value | |
| try await Task.detached(priority: .userInitiated) { | |
| try withExtendedLifetime(addressSigner) { | |
| try walletId.withUnsafeBytes { widRaw in | |
| guard let widPtr = widRaw.baseAddress?.assumingMemoryBound(to: UInt8.self) | |
| else { | |
| throw PlatformWalletError.invalidParameter("walletId baseAddress is nil") | |
| } | |
| try recipientRaw43.withUnsafeBytes { recipientRaw in | |
| guard let recipientPtr = recipientRaw.baseAddress? | |
| .assumingMemoryBound(to: UInt8.self) | |
| else { | |
| throw PlatformWalletError.invalidParameter( | |
| "recipient baseAddress is nil" | |
| ) | |
| } | |
| let send: (UnsafePointer<CChar>?) throws -> Void = { memoCStr in | |
| try platform_wallet_manager_shielded_shield_to_recipient( | |
| handle, widPtr, shieldedAccount, paymentAccount, | |
| recipientPtr, amount, memoCStr, signerHandle | |
| ).check() | |
| } | |
| if let memo, !memo.isEmpty { | |
| try memo.withCString { try send($0) } | |
| } else { | |
| try send(nil) | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| }.value |
source: ['codex']
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Fixed in 766d4e4 — both shieldedShieldToRecipient and shieldedShield (same weaker pattern) now wrap the whole marshalling + FFI call in withExtendedLifetime(addressSigner), matching shieldedTransfer.
| @@ -457,12 +463,20 @@ pub async fn shield<S: ShieldedStore, Sig: Signer<PlatformAddress>, P: OrchardPr | |||
| wallet_id: WalletId, | |||
| keys: &AccountViewingKeys, | |||
| account: u32, | |||
| recipient: Option<&PaymentAddress>, | |||
| inputs: BTreeMap<PlatformAddress, Credits>, | |||
| amount: u64, | |||
| memo: [u8; 36], | |||
| signer: &Sig, | |||
| prover: &P, | |||
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🟡 Suggestion: Preserve the existing public shield Rust API
wallet::shielded and its operations module are public, making this pub async fn shield reachable by downstream Rust consumers even though it is not re-exported at the crate root. Adding mandatory recipient and memo parameters therefore breaks existing callers, contrary to the PR's additive/no-breaking-change contract. Keep the previous signature as a wrapper that supplies the default recipient and empty memo, and expose the new behavior through a separately named function or private implementation helper.
source: ['codex']
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Done in 766d4e4: operations::shield keeps its pre-recipient signature as a self-shield front, and the recipient/memo behavior moved to the new pub async fn shield_to — mirroring the wallet-level shielded_shield_from_account / _to_recipient split. The PR description's "existing signatures are untouched" claim holds again.
| let (recipient_addr, external_counterparty) = match recipient { | ||
| Some(payment_address) => ( | ||
| payment_address_to_orchard(payment_address)?, | ||
| Some(payment_address.to_raw_address_bytes().to_vec()), | ||
| ), | ||
| None => (default_orchard_address(keys)?, None), | ||
| }; |
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🟡 Suggestion: Do not infer an external recipient from Option::Some
A valid PaymentAddress passed through the new recipient API can belong to the selected shielded account, including a diversified address. This branch classifies every Some value as Sent/Out, while restoration tests ownership with incoming_viewing_key.diversifier_index and classifies an own output as incoming or a self-transfer. That makes live and restored activity semantics diverge for an input the public raw-address API currently accepts. Enforce the method's documented third-party invariant by rejecting addresses recognized by the source account and directing callers to the self-shield API.
| let (recipient_addr, external_counterparty) = match recipient { | |
| Some(payment_address) => ( | |
| payment_address_to_orchard(payment_address)?, | |
| Some(payment_address.to_raw_address_bytes().to_vec()), | |
| ), | |
| None => (default_orchard_address(keys)?, None), | |
| }; | |
| let (recipient_addr, external_counterparty) = match recipient { | |
| Some(payment_address) => { | |
| if keys | |
| .incoming_viewing_key | |
| .diversifier_index(payment_address) | |
| .is_some() | |
| { | |
| return Err(PlatformWalletError::ShieldedBuildError( | |
| "recipient belongs to the source shielded account; use shield-to-self" | |
| .to_string(), | |
| )); | |
| } | |
| ( | |
| payment_address_to_orchard(payment_address)?, | |
| Some(payment_address.to_raw_address_bytes().to_vec()), | |
| ) | |
| } | |
| None => (default_orchard_address(keys)?, None), | |
| }; |
source: ['codex']
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Done in 766d4e4: recipient resolution now lives in a pure resolve_shield_recipient helper that rejects a Some address the account's own IVK recognizes (diversifier_index, the same test the scan's is_own_orchard_recipient uses — so diversified own addresses are caught too), directing callers to the self-shield entry point. The third-party contract is now documented at the wallet method, the FFI export, and the Swift method.
| let prover = CachedOrchardProver::new(); | ||
| let st = build_shield_transition( | ||
| &recipient, | ||
| amount, | ||
| inputs, | ||
| vec![AddressFundsFeeStrategyStep::DeductFromInput(0)], | ||
| &DummySigner, | ||
| 0, | ||
| &&prover, | ||
| memo, | ||
| // Production config (`operations::shield`): OVK-keyed to the | ||
| // SENDER, so the sender's scan can recover the send. | ||
| Some(sender_keys.outgoing_viewing_key.clone()), | ||
| PlatformVersion::latest(), | ||
| ) | ||
| .await | ||
| .expect("shield transition build should succeed"); |
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🟡 Suggestion: Exercise the new live-activity branch in tests
The new test invokes the pre-existing build_shield_transition primitive directly, so it does not exercise this PR's wallet or operations::shield changes. It would still pass if the wallet ignored the recipient, dropped the memo before calling the builder, or recorded the external payment as Shield/In. Add focused coverage through the new wallet path, or extract its activity-parameter preparation into a pure helper, and assert recipient and memo forwarding plus Sent/Out, raw-43 counterparty, and live-versus-scan activity-ID alignment.
source: ['codex']
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Addressed via the extraction option in 766d4e4: the activity-parameter preparation is now the pure resolve_shield_recipient helper with four tests — None → default address + Shield/In + no counterparty, external → Sent/Out + raw-43 counterparty, own default rejected, own diversified rejected. Recipient/memo forwarding into the built bundle stays covered by the round-trip decrypt test (shield_to_external_recipient_decrypts_for_recipient_and_recovers_for_sender); a full pass through operations::shield_to would need a mockable SDK broadcast seam this crate doesn't have.
|
Heads-up from working the sibling panic-guard area on #4312: the new export |
… unwinding across the C ABI block_on_worker .expects on the task's JoinError, so a panic inside the proving future would re-panic in the extern "C" frame and abort the process on unwind-enabled hosts (Android, host tests). Split the export into a catch_spend_panic wrapper + shielded_shield_to_recipient_inner, mapping a panic to ErrorShieldedSpendUnconfirmed — the conservative do-not-retry contract, since the transition may already have been broadcast when the panic struck. The guard helpers mirror the ones #4312 adds for the sibling exports so the two branches converge on merge. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
Fixed in e7c2e49 — good catch, thanks. The export now runs through the standard split: One coordination note: since |
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## v4.2-dev #4472 +/- ##
============================================
- Coverage 87.39% 86.69% -0.71%
============================================
Files 2735 2735
Lines 347804 350211 +2407
============================================
- Hits 303980 303610 -370
- Misses 43824 46601 +2777
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…ixes Three review findings on the shield-to-recipient surface: - operations::shield keeps its pre-recipient signature as a self-shield front over the new shield_to, so the public free function stays source-compatible; the recipient/memo behavior lives in shield_to. - A recipient the account's own IVK recognizes (default or diversified, the same diversifier_index test the scan's is_own_orchard_recipient uses) is rejected in resolve_shield_recipient instead of classified: its note would be spendable here, and a live Sent/Out row would fork from the self-pay row a restore's scan derives. The resolution + classification is a pure helper with four unit tests. - Swift shieldedShield / shieldedShieldToRecipient pin the KeychainSigner with withExtendedLifetime across the whole detached FFI call; the bare `_ = addressSigner` last-use is not a guaranteed keepalive under optimized ARC while Rust still signs through the unretained ctx. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Reviewed |
Brings the branch up to date with upstream after #4457, #4465, #4399, #4467, #4257, #4382, #4423, #4463, #4377, #4440, #4472, #4477, #4470, and #4469 landed on v4.2-dev (base tip 1e26927). One conflict, in packages/kotlin-sdk/.../dashsdk/wallet/ManagedCoreWallet.kt: upstream #4377 inserts a new setGapLimit() immediately above broadcastTransaction(), while this branch rewrites that same broadcastTransaction() — expanding its KDoc to document the age-guard refusal and wrapping the body in mapNativeErrors { } so the native stale-broadcast error (code 34) surfaces typed. The two edits are additive and independent, so resolved as the union: setGapLimit() kept verbatim from upstream, broadcastTransaction() kept verbatim from this branch. Three more files overlapped but auto-merged, and were verified rather than assumed: - changeset/core_bridge.rs: this branch factors the input walk into spent_outpoint()/spent_outpoints() so the in-broadcast fence and the persister's spent-set cannot disagree about which inputs count; upstream #4257 replaces the synthetic ScriptBuf::default() with the input's real locking script. Orthogonal — #4257 changes the Utxo payload, the fence's filter predicate is unchanged. Both sides' tests pass, including #4257's two new script-reconstruction tests running through this branch's refactored walk. - manager/mod.rs: upstream adds the tracked_masternodes field and its initializer; this branch's SpendObservationHandler registration and its cfg(any(test, feature = "shielded")) widening are untouched. - rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/error.rs: upstream adds ErrorMasternodeListUnavailable = 46; this branch maps PlatformWalletError::StaleReservation onto the existing shared code 34. No discriminant or name collides. Upstream's three new PlatformWalletPersistence methods all carry default bodies, so this branch's NoopTestPersister needs no change. Verified: the merged tree is identical to origin/v4.2-dev except in exactly the 18 files this branch owns, and this branch's net delta against the new base is unchanged at +3457/-103. cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib: 784 passed, 0 failed. cargo test -p platform-wallet-ffi --lib: 278 passed, 0 failed. cargo fmt --check and cargo clippy --all-targets -D warnings: clean on both crates.
Brings the shielded-invite branch up to date with upstream v4.2-dev (#4470 active-protocol-version shielded fees, #4472 shield credits to an external Orchard recipient, #4477, #4469 swift async shutdown). One conflict, in rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/shielded/operations.rs: both sides appended a #[cfg(test)] module at the same insertion point — this branch's foreign_claim_guard_tests (single-flight claim lifecycle guard, #4313 review finding 979bbc2fcb3c) and upstream #4472's shield_recipient_tests (resolve_shield_recipient classification). Resolved by keeping BOTH modules in full, this branch's first, each under its own #[cfg(test)]. No code from either side dropped or altered. The FFI error-code seam needed no hand-merge: upstream #4469's ErrorMasternodeListUnavailable = 46 was allocated explicitly around this branch's 43/44/45 shielded-invite trio. Verified: cargo check -p platform-wallet --features shielded and platform-wallet-ffi --all-features clean; cargo test platform-wallet --features shielded --lib = 984 passed / 1 failed — shield_input_selection_tests::regression_reports_max_from_usable_suffix _not_total_account_balance, proven PRE-EXISTING on unmerged origin/v4.2-dev (1e26927): upstream's versioned-fee change dropped shield_fee_reserve_credits(LATEST) below the test's seeded 297_264_780 leading balance; the unmerged PR head passes it. platform-wallet-ffi = 330 passed / 0 failed; rs-unified-sdk-jni = 37 passed / 0 failed; kotlin-sdk :sdk:test = 353 tests x debug+release, 0 failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…4470 active-version fees + #4472 shield-to-recipient) Reconciles the branch with the active-protocol-version fee estimation (#4470), the shield-to-external-Orchard-recipient operation (#4472), the block-time truncation fix (#4477) and the async wallet-manager shutdown (#4469). One textual conflict, packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/shielded_send.rs, plus one silent auto-merge hazard in the same file: - Duplicate guard helpers (auto-merged, NOT flagged by git). #4472 adopted this branch's panic-guard split verbatim, so the merge kept BOTH copies of panic_payload_message / catch_panic_to_code / SPEND_PANIC_GUIDANCE / catch_spend_panic. The bodies are byte identical; this branch's copy is a strict superset (it also carries IDENTITY_CREATE_PANIC_GUIDANCE, ASSET_LOCK_FUNDING_PANIC_GUIDANCE and SEED_POOL_PANIC_GUIDANCE for its non-spend guard call sites). Kept this branch's block, deleted upstream's duplicate, and widened the SPEND_PANIC_GUIDANCE doc to name shield-to-recipient among the operations it covers. - The shared guard tests. Upstream re-labelled the operation string in catch_spend_panic_maps_a_panic_to_the_unconfirmed_contract from "shielded multi-output transfer" to "shielded shield to recipient" and dropped the #4312 review-finding citation. Kept this branch's labels and citation (one test name, one definition); the guard the new export uses is exercised either way, and this branch's catch_panic_to_code_carries_the_per_operation_contract and max_recipients_matches_the_effective_action_ceiling tests survive. Everything else interleaved cleanly and was verified rather than assumed: this branch's four catch_pre_broadcast_panic sites (unshield / transfer / transfer_multi / withdraw) and catch_pre_broadcast_panic_async sit outside shield(), which is the only function #4472 rewrote in operations.rs (into shield + shield_to + resolve_shield_recipient), so both survive whole. No FFI export and no test was lost from either side: the merged shielded_send.rs gains exactly platform_wallet_manager_shielded_shield_to_recipient, and the only retired test is upstream's own rename of estimate_fee_matches_observed_onchain_values_for_2_actions into its protocol-13 / protocol-14 / manager-handle triple. No fee numbers needed recalibrating, and the output-aware predictor needed no change to adopt #4470's active-version sourcing: it is already version-parameterized end to end and every production call site feeds it sdk.version() -- the same network-tracked accessor #4470 switched the FFI estimator to. ShieldedFeeKind::compute takes &PlatformVersion (note_selection.rs:56); select_notes_with_fee and select_notes_for_denomination thread it through (:197-207, :288-311); reserve_unspent_notes and its denomination sibling pass sdk.version() (operations.rs:2329, :2362), as do shield's fee carve (:593) and every builder call (:647, :887, :1081, :1285, :1495, :1708, :1907). PlatformVersion::latest() survives only in #[cfg(test)] fixtures and in MAX_SHIELDED_TRANSFER_RECIPIENTS's ceiling assertion -- a structural action bound, not a fee, and version-invariant in any case (max_shielded_transition_actions = 16 and max_state_transition_size = 20480 in every system_limits version, so protocol 13 and 14 yield the same ceiling of 6). The shield_input_selection fixture survives because it derives: reserve() calls shield_fee_reserve_credits(LATEST_PLATFORM_VERSION) (platform_wallet.rs:2203) rather than pinning a literal, so it tracks any fee-constant movement automatically. #4470 did not touch reserves at all. Verified: cargo fmt --check and cargo clippy clean on platform-wallet, platform-wallet-ffi, dpp and rs-unified-sdk-jni. Tests: 942 passed platform-wallet (--features shielded --lib), including all four *_prover_panic_releases_the_note_reservation tests, all twelve shield_input_selection_tests and #4472's four shield_recipient_tests; 294 passed platform-wallet-ffi (--features shielded --lib), including #4470's estimate_fee protocol-13 / protocol-14 / manager-handle / unknown-handle tests; 241 passed dpp shielded (--all-features --lib shielded), including all three wire_cost_measured_tests. 0 failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
3 participants
Issue being fixed or feature implemented
Hosts cannot pay a third-party shielded address from Platform Payment credits in one transition: the Type 15 shield builder (
build_shield_transition) has always taken an arbitrary recipient, but the wallet layer pinned it to the account's own default Orchard address. dashwallet-ios surfaces this as a dead-end error ("This address can't be paid from your Platform balance") on the Platform balance-row Send sheet.What was done?
operations::shield_totakes an optionalrecipient: Option<&PaymentAddress>plus a 36-byte memo;operations::shieldkeeps its existing signature as a self-shield front over it.Nonekeeps today's shield-to-self behavior exactly (Shield/In activity, empty memo).Some(addr)builds the note for that address and records the live activity as Sent/Out with the recipient's raw-43 counterparty and the memo — the same classification the scan deriver already produces for an OVK-recovered send to a non-own address, so a restored wallet derives the same row and the live/scan activity ids stay aligned (visible-cmx hashing unchanged).resolve_shield_recipientrejects aSomeaddress the account's own IVK recognizes (default or any diversified index — the samediversifier_indextest the scan'sis_own_orchard_recipientuses), because its note would be spendable here and a live Sent/Out row would fork from the self-pay row a restore's scan derives.PlatformWallet::shielded_shield_from_account_to_recipientparses the raw-43 recipient likeshielded_transfer_toand shares the existing selection/single-flight/preflight body withshielded_shield_from_account.platform_wallet_manager_shielded_shield_to_recipient(wallet id, shielded/payment account, recipient_raw_43, amount, memo_text, signer), guarded by the standardcatch_spend_panicsplit (helpers mirrored from feat(platform-wallet): multi-output shielded transfers + output-aware fee predictor #4312 — whichever PR merges second dedupes them). The existing shield extern is untouched, so the JNI binding keeps compiling.shieldedShieldToRecipient, mirroringshieldedTransfer's recipient/memo handling; it andshieldedShieldnow pin the signer withwithExtendedLifetimeacross the whole detached FFI call.No consensus change: the shield transition already carries the recipient inside the opaque Orchard action;
shielded_shield_preflightis recipient-agnostic and unchanged.How Has This Been Tested?
shield_to_external_recipient_decrypts_for_recipient_and_recovers_for_sender: the built bundle's real output IVK-decrypts only for the recipient (at the sent amount), never for the sender, and OVK-recovers for the sender with the recipient address and memo intact.resolve_shield_recipient(self default → Shield/In; external → Sent/Out + raw-43 counterparty; own default rejected; own diversified rejected) and two on the FFIcatch_spend_panicguard (pass-through; panic →ErrorShieldedSpendUnconfirmed).cargo fmt/clippy --workspace --all-targets --all-features -D warnings/cargo check --workspace --all-featuresall clean; wallet-crate tests: 897 passed, 1 failed —regression_reports_max_from_usable_suffix_not_total_account_balance, which fails identically on a clean v4.2-dev checkout (fixture invalidated by the feat(dpp)!: rebalance the shielded fee constants for protocol 14 #4467 fee-constant rebalance; unrelated to this change)../build_ios.sh --target simincl. the example app with warnings-as-errors; dashwallet-ios builds and smoke-tests against this branch (app PR to follow, linked once open).Breaking Changes
None — the new FFI entry point and wallet/SDK methods are additive; existing signatures are untouched.
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Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes
Tests