fix(security): pin third-party GitHub Actions to commit SHAs in CI/release workflows#6229
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Unpinned tag references for third-party actions can be silently mutated. Pin each action to its commit SHA so the workflow is immune to tag redirection attacks that could exfiltrate PYPI_TOKEN / RELEASE_PAT or inject malicious code into CI. Actions pinned: - astral-sh/setup-uv@v7 → @94527f2e458b27549849d47d273a16bec83a01e9 - actions/checkout@v6 → @df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 - actions/setup-python@v6 → @ece7cb06caefa5fff74198d8649806c4678c61a1 - pre-commit/action@v3.0.1 → @2c7b3805fd2a0fd8c1884dcaebf91fc102a13ecd
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Summary
Mutable tag references for third-party Actions in the release-publish and continuous-integration workflows introduce a supply-chain risk: if the upstream tag is silently moved (e.g. via a compromised maintainer account, a typosquat, or a direct repo compromise), a malicious version of the action will run with full access to repository secrets on the next triggered run.
Affected Workflows
release-publish.yml(HIGH)astral-sh/setup-uv@v7@94527f2e…actions/checkout@v6@df4cb1c0…actions/setup-python@v6@ece7cb06…This workflow has
contents: writepermission and accessesPYPI_TOKEN(publishes to PyPI) andRELEASE_PAT(full GitHub PAT). A compromisedastral-sh/setup-uv@v7tag could exfiltrate both secrets, enabling a supply-chain attack on every downstream user ofgoogle-adk.continuous-integration.yml(MEDIUM)pre-commit/action@v3.0.1@2c7b3805…astral-sh/setup-uv@v7@94527f2e…actions/checkout@v6@df4cb1c0…actions/setup-python@v6@ece7cb06…CI runs on every PR/push and has access to
GITHUB_TOKEN. A compromised action here could exfiltrate tokens and inject malicious code into CI artifacts.Fix
Pin every action to its exact commit SHA (with the human-readable tag preserved as a comment). This is the approach recommended by GitHub's own security hardening guide and OpenSSF Scorecards.
This change has zero functional impact — the same action code runs, only the resolution is now deterministic and tamper-proof.