Oleh Borysovskyy | Active Directory Security & Sysadmin Home Lab
This repository documents hands-on work securing and administering an Active Directory environment using Windows Server 2025 and Windows 10 in a virtualized home lab. Focused on real-world sysadmin tasks, GPO hardening, user/group management, and common AD attack vector defense.
| Component | Details |
|---|---|
| Domain Controller | Windows Server 2025 (Datacenter) |
| Client Machine | Windows 10 Pro (domain-joined) |
| Domain Name | mycyber.local |
| Hypervisor | VirtualBox (Host: Windows 11) |
| Network | Internal Lab VLAN (isolated) |
| Monitoring | Security Onion 2.4 (SIEM/IDS) |
AD-Security-Lab/
βββ gpo/ # Group Policy Object configurations
βββ user-management/ # User/group creation scripts and docs
βββ hardening/ # AD and Windows Server hardening steps
βββ attack-defense/ # AD attack simulations and mitigations
βββ scripts/ # PowerShell automation scripts
βββ screenshots/ # Lab evidence and documentation
βββ README.md
- Installed and configured Windows Server 2025 as Domain Controller
- Promoted server to DC with
mycyber.localdomain - Configured DNS, DHCP on the DC
- Joined Windows 10 client to the domain
- Verified domain connectivity and login
- Created Organizational Units (OUs): IT, HR, Management
- Created domain users and assigned to OUs
- Created security groups and assigned user memberships
- Configured account lockout policy (5 attempts / 30 min lockout)
- Enforced password complexity policy
- Created and linked GPOs to specific OUs
- Disabled USB storage via GPO (removable media restriction)
- Enforced screensaver lock policy (15 min timeout)
- Restricted Control Panel access for standard users
- Configured Windows Firewall rules via GPO
- Deployed software restrictions (AppLocker baseline)
- Tested GPO application with
gpupdate /forceandgpresult /r
- Disabled NTLM v1, enforced NTLMv2
- Enabled SMB signing on DC
- Disabled legacy protocols (SMBv1)
- Configured audit policies (logon events, account management, object access)
- Reviewed Event Viewer: Security log (Event IDs 4624, 4625, 4740)
- Enabled Windows Defender and configured exclusions
- Simulated brute-force login attempt β monitored Event ID 4625 alerts in Security Onion
- Tested Kerberoasting detection (SPN enumeration)
- Simulated Pass-the-Hash β reviewed NTLM authentication logs
- Verified account lockout triggering and alerting
# Create 10 test users in the IT OU
$password = ConvertTo-SecureString "Lab@12345!" -AsPlainText -Force
1..10 | ForEach-Object {
New-ADUser -Name "TestUser$_" `
-SamAccountName "testuser$_" `
-UserPrincipalName "testuser$_@mycyber.local" `
-Path "OU=IT,DC=mycyber,DC=local" `
-AccountPassword $password `
-Enabled $true
}Search-ADAccount -LockedOut | Select-Object Name, SamAccountName, LastLogonDateGet-ADComputer -Filter * | ForEach-Object {
Invoke-GPUpdate -Computer $_.Name -Force
}| Event ID | Description |
|---|---|
| 4624 | Successful logon |
| 4625 | Failed logon attempt |
| 4648 | Logon with explicit credentials |
| 4740 | Account locked out |
| 4728 | Member added to security group |
| 4732 | Member added to local group |
| 4776 | DC validated credentials (NTLM) |
| 7045 | New service installed |
- Configure fine-grained password policies (PSO)
- Set up read-only domain controller (RODC)
- Implement AD tiering model (Tier 0/1/2)
- Configure privileged access workstation (PAW) concept
- Add Winlogbeat β Security Onion log forwarding documentation
- Document BloodHound AD enumeration and defense
- Active Directory Users and Computers (ADUC)
- Group Policy Management Console (GPMC)
- PowerShell (AD module)
- Event Viewer
- Security Onion 2.4 (SIEM monitoring)
- Mimikatz (attack simulation β isolated lab only)
- BloodHound (AD enumeration)
- Wireshark (network traffic analysis)
- β CompTIA Security+ (completed)
- π― CompTIA CySA+ (pursuing)
- π― Microsoft AZ-800 (Windows Server Hybrid Admin)
Part of my broader cybersecurity home lab β see Oleh-Borysovskyy for the full lab overview.