The latest release (and the current main branch). There are no backport
branches; fixes ship as a new release.
Please report vulnerabilities privately via GitHub security advisories (the "Report a vulnerability" button under the repository's Security tab). Do not open a public issue for anything exploitable.
You can expect an acknowledgment within a few days. This is an indie project — there is no bug bounty — but reporters get credit in the advisory and release notes (or anonymity, if preferred).
Areas worth attention, roughly in order of interest:
- Auth: session cookies (
flick_session, HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure behind TLS), the email-first login flow, email login codes, OAuth/OIDC callback handling, guest-session minting. - Uploads & parsers: PDF, EPUB, TXT, and Kindle-clippings parsing of attacker-supplied files (25 MB limit), plus HTML extraction for imports.
- URL import / SSRF:
POST /api/import/urlfetches user-supplied URLs. The guard resolves DNS, rejects non-global addresses (loopback, RFC1918, CGNAT, link-local, ULA, v4-mapped v6), and pins the connection to the vetted IP to prevent rebinding. Bypasses of this guard are squarely in scope. - Rate limiting: the
X-Forwarded-Fortrust rule (only honored from private/loopback peers) and anything that lets a client dodge the auth endpoint limits. - Access control: all book/stats routes are scoped to the session user; any cross-user read or write is a serious bug.
Out of scope: denial of service via volume alone, reports about missing security headers on a bare (unproxied) HTTP deployment, and anything requiring a compromised host.