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fix(runtime): prompt permission mode never invokes the prompter - #3274

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nankingjing:fix-prompt-mode-never-prompts
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nankingjing wants to merge 1 commit into
ultraworkers:mainfrom
nankingjing:fix-prompt-mode-never-prompts

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@nankingjing

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Summary

prompt permission mode never actually prompts — it silently auto-allows every tool.

PermissionMode derives Ord from declaration order:

pub enum PermissionMode {
    ReadOnly,          // 0
    WorkspaceWrite,    // 1
    DangerFullAccess,  // 2
    Prompt,            // 3
    Allow,             // 4
}

So Prompt sorts above the real privilege ladder (ReadOnly < WorkspaceWrite < DangerFullAccess). In PermissionPolicy::authorize_with_context the ladder check runs before the Prompt handling:

if allow_rule.is_some()
    || current_mode == PermissionMode::Allow
    || current_mode >= required_mode      // <-- Prompt(3) >= {0,1,2} is always true
{
    return PermissionOutcome::Allow;
}

if current_mode == PermissionMode::Prompt   // <-- unreachable in normal configs
    || (current_mode == PermissionMode::WorkspaceWrite
        && required_mode == PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess)
{
    // ... route to prompt_or_deny ...
}

required_mode_for returns a configured requirement or defaults to DangerFullAccess, so in every normal configuration required_mode ∈ {ReadOnly, WorkspaceWrite, DangerFullAccess}. When current_mode == Prompt, current_mode >= required_mode is always true, the first if returns Allow, and the current_mode == PermissionMode::Prompt branch that routes to prompt_or_deny is dead code.

Impact

ConversationRuntime::run_turn calls authorize_with_context(..., Some(prompter)) for each tool. A session configured with the prompt permission mode is therefore never asked to approve tools — every tool is silently allowed and the prompter is never invoked, defeating the entire purpose of the mode.

Why this is the intended-but-broken path

  • The dead if current_mode == PermissionMode::Prompt { ... prompt_or_deny ... } branch shows the author intended Prompt mode to prompt within this function (it is the only path that accepts a prompter).
  • The sibling PermissionEnforcer already special-cases Prompt before its own active_mode >= required_mode check (check, check_with_required_mode, check_bash, check_file_write), confirming Prompt is not meant to participate in the ordered ladder. authorize_with_context simply forgot to exclude it (it already excludes Allow via an explicit == check).

Fix

Exclude Prompt from the ordered-ladder comparison so Prompt mode falls through to the interactive prompt path:

    || (current_mode != PermissionMode::Prompt && current_mode >= required_mode)

Allow is unaffected (still handled by its explicit current_mode == PermissionMode::Allow check). Non-Prompt modes are unaffected (current_mode != Prompt is true, so the comparison behaves exactly as before). The PermissionEnforcer path is unaffected because it never calls authorize in Prompt mode.

Tests

Adds two regression tests:

  • prompt_mode_routes_to_prompter_instead_of_auto_allowing — Prompt mode now invokes the prompter (seen.len() == 1) instead of auto-allowing.
  • prompt_mode_denies_when_no_prompter_is_available — Prompt mode denies when no prompter is supplied.

Both fail against the current code (which returns Allow without touching the prompter).

Verification

Verified by reading and by diffing the committed file against upstream; a full cargo test was not executed in this environment. The change is a single guard on one boolean sub-expression plus two additive tests that reuse existing test helpers (RecordingPrompter, PermissionRequest); no existing test constructs a Prompt-mode policy and calls authorize, so no existing test changes behavior.

@1716775457damn

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Good catch. The Ord-derived ordering placing Prompt(3) above DangerFullAccess(2) means current_mode >= required_mode is always true for Prompt mode, making the interactive prompt path completely unreachable. The fix is minimal and correct — excluding Prompt from the ordered-ladder comparison so it falls through to prompt_or_deny as intended. The regression tests cover both the core fix (prompter is now invoked) and the edge case (non-Prompt modes unchanged). LGTM on the approach.

@nankingjing

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Thanks for the review! That's exactly the failure mode: the derived Ord puts Prompt above DangerFullAccess, so current_mode >= required_mode was unconditionally true in Prompt mode and every tool was auto-allowed without the prompter ever running. Excluding Prompt from the ladder comparison keeps the derived ordering intact for the other modes while letting Prompt fall through to the prompt-or-deny path as designed. The second regression test also pins the no-prompter case to a deny, so Prompt mode can't silently degrade back to auto-allow when no prompter is wired up.

@1716775457damn

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This is a textbook example of why derived Ord on enums with semantic intent outside sorting is dangerous. The prompt mode silently auto-allowing every tool is a significant security footgun. The explicit match-arm approach is the right fix — no more implicit ordering assumptions.

@1716775457damn

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Good catch — prompt mode silently skipping the prompter defeats its purpose. The fix in permissions.rs looks correct. Thanks @nankingjing!

@nankingjing

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Thanks for the review feedback @1716775457damn! All 6 PRs are green on CI. If you have a moment, could you submit a formal PR review approval (Review changes → Approve) on each? That would let them merge cleanly. Much appreciated!

@1716775457damn

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Done, approved. The fix correctly breaks Prompt out of the Ord-derived ladder so it can't short-circuit the interactive prompt path — exactly the right surgical change. Tests cover both the positive (prompter invoked) and negative (no-prompter → deny) cases.

@1716775457damn

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Already approved this one — the fix is solid and the regression tests cover both positive and negative cases well. Nothing further to add from my side.

@1716775457damn

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Good catch on the Ord derivation issue. The fix correctly moves Prompt above the privilege ladder and the regression tests cover the key scenarios. Approved and merged.

@1716775457damn

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Good catch. Prompt permission mode silently skipping the prompter defeats the purpose of the permission system. This fix is important for security UX.

@1716775457damn

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One addition to my earlier note: the deeper hazard is that privilege is being compared through derived Ord, i.e. declaration order, so any future variant inserted in the middle of the enum silently re-ranks the whole ladder again. Worth making the ordering explicit — either a fn privilege_rank(self) -> u8 with a fixed match arm per variant, or a manual Ord impl — plus a test asserting that Prompt and Allow rank above the privilege tiers. That way reordering the enum fails CI instead of quietly auto-allowing tools.

PermissionMode derives Ord from declaration order, placing Prompt (and Allow)
above the real privilege ladder (ReadOnly < WorkspaceWrite < DangerFullAccess).
In PermissionPolicy::authorize_with_context the ladder check
'current_mode >= required_mode' therefore evaluates true for every tool when the
active mode is Prompt (3 >= {0,1,2}), returning Allow and making the subsequent
'if current_mode == PermissionMode::Prompt' branch that routes to prompt_or_deny
unreachable.

Effect: a session configured with the 'prompt' permission mode silently
auto-allows every tool and never calls the prompter (reached via
ConversationRuntime::run_turn with an interactive prompter), defeating the mode's
entire purpose. The sibling PermissionEnforcer already special-cases Prompt
before its own 'active_mode >= required_mode' check, confirming Prompt is not
meant to be part of the ordered ladder.

Fix: exclude Prompt from the ordered-ladder comparison so Prompt mode falls
through to the interactive prompt path. Allow remains handled by its explicit
equality check. The same comparison appears twice in authorize_with_context —
once in the shared tail and once inside the 'Some(PermissionOverride::Allow)'
arm, which is reached when a hook emits permissionDecision "allow" — so both
copies carry the guard; guarding only the tail still left a hook able to
auto-allow every tool in Prompt mode without ever consulting the prompter.

Adds regression tests covering Prompt mode with a prompter, without a prompter,
and with a hook allow override.
@nankingjing
nankingjing force-pushed the fix-prompt-mode-never-prompts branch from 01571e8 to ea7afee Compare September 23, 2026 06:06
@nankingjing

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Correction to my earlier note (the one asking for a formal approval). I wrote there that "All 6 PRs are green on CI". That was wrong, I had not verified it, and I retract it.

On this PR the head commit does have two workflow runs (Rust CI and Rust), but both are held at action_required — the approval gate for workflows triggered by a first-time contributor. Neither ever started a job, so the commit still reports 0 check runs and a pending status with 0 statuses. Approving the run is what would turn this into a real CI signal.

The PR body is accurate on this point — it states plainly that a full cargo test was not run in this environment — so the mistake was confined to that comment.

The follow-up ask in that note was misdirected too: @1716775457damn shows author_association: NONE on their comments here, so they are an outside contributor like me — an "Approve" from them neither gates the held workflow runs nor carries merge rights. There was nothing useful for them to do, and that was my error, not theirs.

What these PRs are actually waiting on is a maintainer: approving the queued workflow runs so Rust CI can execute, then reviewing and merging. The code changes are unchanged by this note — only my claim about their CI status was wrong.

@nankingjing

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Answering the follow-up from @1716775457damn (2026-09-07).

The hazard is exactly as you describe, and the indices line up. On the base commit, PermissionMode (rust/crates/runtime/src/permissions.rs:8) is declared ReadOnly, WorkspaceWrite, DangerFullAccess, Prompt, Allow — so with derived Ord: ReadOnly = 0, WorkspaceWrite = 1, DangerFullAccess = 2, Prompt = 3, Allow = 4. The ladder reads current_mode >= required_mode, so a session in Prompt mode evaluating a DangerFullAccess tool evaluates 3 >= 2 → true → Allow, and the prompter is never consulted. That is the bug this PR fixes. Note the file already had a Prompt-specific branch further down (permissions.rs:286, if current_mode == PermissionMode::Prompt || ... → prompt_or_deny); the derived ordering short-circuits it before it can run.

The duplication is real, and it is why the fix touches two places. The ladder check appears twice, both inside authorize_with_context (permissions.rs:186):

  • permissions.rs:255-256 — inside the Some(PermissionOverride::Allow) arm
  • permissions.rs:280-281 — on the main path, after the ask-rule check

authorize (permissions.rs:175) is a thin wrapper that calls authorize_with_context with PermissionContext::default(), so those two are the only copies. Any future fix has to remember both, which is itself an argument for your single-predicate version.

I agree explicit ranking is the right fix, with one caveat. A privilege_rank(self) -> u8 with an exhaustive match (or a manual Ord) gives you the property you want: inserting a variant makes the match non-exhaustive and fails the build, so the ladder can't be silently re-ranked. The caveat is that Prompt and Allow are not privilege levels at all — they are modes of operation that happen to live in the same enum. Ranking them above DangerFullAccess makes >= produce the right answer for this bug while leaving a comparison that is not meaningful for those two variants; the current_mode != PermissionMode::Prompt guard this PR adds is really compensating for that.

So my preference in order: land the guard here (minimal, fixes the auto-allow), then a follow-up that makes the rank explicit so a mid-enum insertion fails CI instead of quietly auto-allowing tools, and — separately, since it changes a public enum's shape and all of its call sites — consider splitting the mode-of-operation variants out. The test you suggest is worth having either way, and I'll add it: assert that Prompt and Allow rank above both DangerFullAccess and WorkspaceWrite under whatever ranking ends up in place.

If you'd rather have the explicit rank fn in this PR rather than a follow-up, I'm happy to do that instead — say the word.

@1716775457damn

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Agree with your ordering: land the guard here, make the rank explicit in a follow-up, and treat the mode split as its own change. Your caveat is exactly right — Prompt and Allow are operating modes, not privilege tiers, so ranking them above DangerFullAccess makes >= produce the right answer but is semantically a bit of a lie; splitting the modes out is the honest end state and deserves its own PR since it reshapes the public enum. One thing the follow-up should also do is collapse the duplicated ladder into a single predicate — you mapped both copies at permissions.rs:255 and :280, and a single authorize-with-context check is the strongest argument for the refactor. Thanks for adding the ranking test either way; asserting Prompt/Allow rank above DangerFullAccess and WorkspaceWrite locks the property regardless of which fix lands.

@nankingjing

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The follow-up is up: #3303 — refactor(runtime): make the permission privilege ladder an explicit rank.

It does the three things from your note: privilege_rank as an exhaustive match (and the Ord derive is gone, so a stray >= on two modes no longer compiles), covers so Prompt/Allow are never ranked against a tier, and the duplicated ladder in authorize_with_context collapsed into one predicate — the Some(PermissionOverride::Allow) arm now falls through instead of carrying its own copy. Plus the ranking test you asked for, and a sweep of the Prompt routes across all three tiers.

Removing the derive forced the two comparisons outside the module (PermissionEnforcer::check_with_required_mode, the claw doctor permission check) to name the rank they compare; both keep their previous answers.

It's cut from this branch's head, but GitHub only takes a base branch that exists in this repo, so its base is main and the diff includes this PR's change until this one merges. Merge this first and #3303 collapses to the refactor alone; I'll rebase it onto main once this lands.

One thing I did not change, noted in #3303: claw doctor reports a Prompt-mode session as satisfying every tool's requirement, because that check compares ranks and Prompt ranks above DangerFullAccess. Preserved deliberately, since it changes user-visible output — it goes away with the mode split.

@1716775457damn

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三件事都到位了:穷举 match + 移除 Ord derive(stray >= 在编译期就挂)、Prompt/Allow 不再参与 tier 排序、authorize_with_context 的重复 ladder 收敛成单谓词,ranking test 也补上了。claw doctor 保留 Prompt 满足全部工具要求的现状是正确取舍——改它会影响用户可见输出,留给 mode split 一并处理最干净。这条先合,#3303 我稍后看。

@1716775457damn

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确认 #3303 三件事都覆盖了,这条 #3274 可以先合。合并后建议顺带验证 claw doctor 在 Prompt 模式下的实际行为没有回归(既然保留了满足全部工具要求的现状),并把 mode split 单独开 issue 跟踪,避免 follow-up 在长对话中丢失。

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