fix(framework,transports): use http client for outbound fetches (#7848) - #7872
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Adds two hardened HTTP clients—`NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient` and `NewPrivateNetworkHTTPClient`—that enforce SSRF protection not only at dial time but also across every redirect hop and on IP-literal destinations routed through a proxy. This closes a gap where a hostile server could use a redirect chain to probe internal addresses that the initial dial guard would never see. - `NewSSRFSafeHTTPClient` wraps `SSRFSafeDialContext` and refuses any redirect that resolves to a non-public address, caps redirect chains at five hops, and blocks redirects to non-http/https schemes. - `NewPrivateNetworkHTTPClient` wraps `PrivateNetworkDialContext` for operators whose targets live on their own network; it still refuses link-local, cloud metadata, and non-http/https redirect targets. - `newGuardedHTTPClient` is the shared assembly point: it wires the dial gate, a `CheckRedirect` hook that resolves every redirect target and runs all resolved addresses through the same policy predicate, and a `guardedProxySelector` that applies the policy to IP-literal destinations before they are handed to a proxy (where the dialer would only see the proxy address). - `IsLinkLocal` is extended to recognise IPv4 link-local addresses embedded in IPv6 transition forms: IPv4-mapped, 6to4 (`2002:a9fe:a9fe::`), NAT64 well-known and local-use prefixes (`64:ff9b::/96`, `64:ff9b:1::/48`), and the Teredo prefix (`2001::/32`), so `169.254.169.254` is still refused regardless of how it is encoded. - Tests cover: loopback entry refusal, end-to-end redirect-to-loopback refusal, redirect to link-local and NAT64-wrapped metadata addresses, non-http scheme redirects, the five-hop cap, and the private-network policy's reachability/refusal split. - [ ] Bug fix - [x] Feature - [ ] Refactor - [ ] Documentation - [ ] Chore/CI - [x] Core (Go) - [x] Transports (HTTP) - [ ] Providers/Integrations - [ ] Plugins - [ ] UI (React) - [ ] Docs ```sh go test ./core/network/... -run TestNewSSRFSafeHTTPClient go test ./core/network/... -run TestNewPrivateNetworkHTTPClient go test ./core/network/... -run TestGuardedClient go test ./core/network/... -run TestIsLinkLocal go test ./core/network/... ``` All new tests are self-contained and use `httptest.Server` for loopback targets; no external network access is required. - [ ] Yes - [x] No - Every connection made through these clients is gated at dial time **and** on each redirect hop, defeating DNS rebinding (the dialer re-resolves at connect time) and redirect-chain probing (CheckRedirect resolves and vets before following). - IPv6 transition encodings of `169.254.0.0/16` (6to4, NAT64, Teredo) are now explicitly refused by `IsLinkLocal`, preventing bypass via address encoding tricks. - Proxy routing is partially guarded: IP-literal destinations are checked before being forwarded to the proxy; hostname destinations are left to the proxy to resolve, which is consistent with how proxy-only deployments work and avoids a false sense of security from a pre-resolution that doesn't bind what the proxy connects to. - The proxy itself is operator-configured (process environment) and is still subject to the dial gate. - [x] I added/updated tests where appropriate - [x] I verified builds succeed (Go and UI)
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📝 SummarySummary by CodeRabbit
WalkthroughThe changes restrict file URL configuration to ChangesNetwork access and URL controls
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to Failed URL checks can put URL credentials or query secrets in debug logs. Log only the hostname before merging, or accept this bounded logging risk. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 3 | ❌ 2❌ Failed checks (2 warnings)
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Full details: Description checkResolution Replace the template prompts with a summary of the private-network-guarded HTTP client and related webhook, URL-validation, and documentation changes. Select the applicable change types and affected areas. Provide the tests run and their results. Complete the breaking-changes, related-issues, security, and checklist sections. Add screenshots only if needed for the UI changes. Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 65.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 20 functions across 14 files. (6 skipped: 6 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
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This was referenced Oct 3, 2026
fix(core,transports): bound request decompression and harden realtime request handling (#7856)
#7880
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akshaydeo
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October 3, 2026 04:28
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Review comments at @transports/bifrost-http/handlers/config.go:
- Line 1399: Update the URL accessibility debug log to avoid exposing
credentials or query secrets: in the logger.Debug call, log parsed.Hostname()
instead of rawURL and adjust the message to identify the logged value as a host.
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📒 Files selected for processing (21)
docs/deployment-guides/how-to/airgapped.mdxdocs/features/webhooks.mdxdocs/openapi/openapi.jsondocs/openapi/paths/management/webhooks.yamldocs/providers/custom-pricing.mdxframework/modelcatalog/datasheet/params.goframework/modelcatalog/datasheet/sync.goframework/modelcatalog/datasheet/sync_test.goframework/modelcatalog/mcp_library_sync.goframework/modelcatalog/mcplibrarysync_test.goframework/webhooks/client.goframework/webhooks/dispatcher_test.gotests/e2e/api/collections/provider-harness.jsontransports/bifrost-http/handlers/config.gotransports/bifrost-http/handlers/config_test.gotransports/bifrost-http/handlers/utils_test.gotransports/bifrost-http/handlers/webhooks.gotransports/bifrost-http/handlers/webhooks_test.gotransports/config.schema.jsonui/app/workspace/config/views/modelSettingsView.tsxui/app/workspace/mcp-registry/library/views/mcpLibrarySettingsSheet.tsx
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This PR hardens the SSRF posture across several subsystems by ensuring that HTTP clients used for outbound fetches (pricing datasheets, model parameter datasheets, MCP library catalog, OAuth2 discovery/registration/token, webhook delivery, and the config API's URL accessibility check) all enforce the private-network dial policy at every connection and redirect hop, not just on the entry URL. Additionally, unauthenticated callers are blocked from test-firing webhook endpoints registered with `allow_private_network`, since the response would otherwise expose the status of private receivers on the gateway's own network.
- **`network.NewPrivateNetworkHTTPClient`** **/** **`network.PrivateNetworkDialContext`**: All outbound HTTP clients in the pricing, model-parameters, MCP library, OAuth2, and config-check paths now use the shared guarded client, which enforces the link-local/unspecified/cloud-metadata block on every dial and redirect hop rather than only on the configured entry URL.
- **`PUT /api/config`** **transport-error opacity**: Failed URL accessibility checks now return only `errURLNotReachable` to the caller; the transport detail (which can include the dialed address or a service banner) goes to the debug log only, preventing this endpoint from acting as a port-scan or banner oracle.
- **Webhook test-fire auth guard**: `POST /api/webhooks/{id}/test` now returns `403` when the caller is unauthenticated (auth bypassed) and the endpoint has `allow_private_network` set. The OpenAPI spec and webhook reference docs are updated to document this response.
- **`newPrivateDialContext`** **inlined into** **`network`** **package**: The bespoke private dialer in `framework/webhooks/client.go` is replaced with `network.PrivateNetworkDialContext`, consolidating the policy in one place and ensuring NAT64/6to4 IPv6 forms of link-local addresses are also blocked.
- **Tests**: New unit and integration tests cover redirect-to-link-local refusal for all affected fetchers, `file://` rejection over the API, transport-error opacity, and the webhook test-fire auth guard. E2E collection adds four cases for the catalog URL scheme enforcement.
- [x] Bug fix
- [ ] Feature
- [x] Refactor
- [x] Documentation
- [ ] Chore/CI
- [x] Core (Go)
- [x] Transports (HTTP)
- [ ] Providers/Integrations
- [ ] Plugins
- [x] UI (React)
- [x] Docs
```sh
go test ./framework/modelcatalog/...
go test ./framework/modelcatalog/datasheet/...
go test ./framework/oauth2/...
go test ./framework/webhooks/...
go test ./transports/bifrost-http/handlers/...
cd ui
pnpm i
pnpm build
```
**Redirect-to-link-local**: each affected fetcher has a test that spins up a loopback server redirecting to `169.254.169.254` and asserts the error contains `"link-local"`.
**Webhook auth guard**: `TestWebhookHandlerTestDeliveryRequiresAuthForPrivateEndpoints` asserts `403` for an unauthenticated test fire against a private endpoint and `200` (attempt made) for a public endpoint with the same caller.
- [x] Yes
- [ ] No
- Closes an SSRF vector where a redirect from a validated entry URL could reach cloud metadata endpoints (`169.254.169.254`, NAT64/6to4 equivalents) across pricing, model-parameter, MCP library, OAuth2, and config-check HTTP clients.
- Prevents the config URL accessibility endpoint from acting as a port-scan or service-banner oracle by returning only a generic `"url is not reachable"` error to callers.
- Blocks unauthenticated callers from using the webhook test-fire endpoint as a probe of the gateway's private network via `allow_private_network` endpoints.
- [x] I read `docs/contributing/README.md` and followed the guidelines
- [x] I added/updated tests where appropriate
- [x] I updated documentation where needed
- [x] I verified builds succeed (Go and UI)
- [x] I verified the CI pipeline passes locally if applicable
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October 3, 2026 07:10
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Summary
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Changes
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If adding new configs or environment variables, document them here.
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docs/contributing/README.mdand followed the guidelines