fix(transports): gate provider endpoint updates (#7850) - #7874
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📝 SummarySummary by CodeRabbit
WalkthroughManagement endpoints now validate proxy and provider-key URL destinations. Provider-key creation and update also validate literal region values. The OpenAPI descriptions and tests cover these validation rules. ChangesManagement request validation
Priority: ⬆️ High Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Temporary DNS failures can prevent otherwise valid proxy and provider-key updates. Skip destination validation for unchanged URLs before merging. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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This was referenced Oct 3, 2026
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This was referenced Oct 3, 2026
fix(core,transports): bound request decompression and harden realtime request handling (#7856)
#7880
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akshaydeo
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October 3, 2026 04:28
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @transports/bifrost-http/handlers/config.go:
- Line 1158: Update the proxy URL validation in the configuration PUT handler to
compare payload.URL with the stored URL and skip destination validation when an
enabled proxy’s URL is unchanged. Continue validating new destinations and URLs
on disabled-to-enabled transitions, while allowing unrelated edits despite DNS
failures.
Review comments at @transports/bifrost-http/handlers/provider_keys.go:
- Around line 292-296: Update the `validateProviderKeyServerURLs` call and
implementation to compare each effective destination URL with its stored value,
skipping DNS validation only when unchanged. Continue validating newly set or
changed URLs, so unrelated key updates can proceed when DNS is temporarily
unavailable.
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📒 Files selected for processing (8)
docs/openapi/paths/management/config.yamldocs/openapi/paths/management/providers.yamldocs/openapi/schemas/management/config.yamltests/e2e/api/collections/provider-harness.jsontransports/bifrost-http/handlers/config.gotransports/bifrost-http/handlers/config_test.gotransports/bifrost-http/handlers/provider_keys.gotransports/bifrost-http/handlers/provider_keys_test.go
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akshaydeo
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Closes a server-side request forgery (SSRF) / credential-interception vulnerability present when dashboard authentication is disabled or unconfigured. In that mode, the management API's fail-open bypass admitted every request without a credential check, allowing any network-reachable caller to redirect where Bifrost sends provider credentials (by setting a provider base URL, key-level endpoint, proxy URL, CA certificate, or absolute request-path override) without ever authenticating.
- **`AuthBypassedMiddleware`** is now installed on the API middleware chain when no config store is present. It stamps every request with `BifrostContextKeyAuthBypassed=true` so that downstream guards can distinguish a genuinely authenticated session from a fail-open admission.
- **Provider base URL / `allow_private_network` guard** (`providerDialTargetChanged`): creating or updating a provider with a new `network_config.base_url` or with `allow_private_network` turned on now returns 403 when auth is bypassed. The flag is guarded even without a base URL because `ConfigureDialer` applies it to key-level URLs (Ollama/SGL/VLLM).
- **Provider interception guard** (`providerInterceptionChanges` / `requireGenuineAuthForInterception`): setting or changing `proxy_config.url`, `proxy_config.ca_cert_pem`, `network_config.ca_cert_pem`, `network_config.insecure_skip_verify`, or any absolute (scheme + host) `custom_provider_config.request_path_overrides` value also returns 403 when auth is bypassed. Echoing stored (redacted) values back unchanged, clearing a proxy, or using path-only overrides is still allowed.
- **Provider key endpoint guard** (`requireGenuineAuthForEndpointChange` / `changedDialTargets` / `keyDialTargets`): creating or updating a key that sets, moves, or removes any caller-chosen dial target — `ollama_key_config.url`, `sgl_key_config.url`, `vllm_key_config.url`, `azure_key_config.endpoint`, `databricks_key_config.workspace_url`, `github_copilot_key_config.github_domain`, `bedrock_key_config.endpoints.*`, `bedrock_mantle_key_config.endpoints.*`, and `aliases.<name>.endpoint` — returns 403 when auth is bypassed. Updates that keep every stored dial target unchanged (e.g. editing weight or models) pass through.
- **Global proxy guard** (`globalProxyInterceptionChanges`): `PUT /api/proxy-config` with a new proxy URL or `skip_tls_verify` turned on returns 403 when auth is bypassed.
- **Proxy and key URL destination validation**: the global proxy URL and Ollama/SGL/VLLM key URLs are now validated with `ValidateExternalURL` (the same rule as provider base URLs). Link-local (e.g. `169.254.169.254`) and unspecified (`0.0.0.0`) addresses are rejected with 400; private and loopback hosts remain allowed because a self-hosted proxy or inference server on the local network is the documented setup.
- **`IsAbsoluteRequestURL`** is extracted from `GetRequestPath` into a named, exported function so the provider interception guard can reuse the same scheme+host detection logic without duplicating it.
- OpenAPI descriptions for `POST /api/providers`, `PUT /api/providers/{name}`, `POST /api/providers/{name}/keys`, `PUT /api/providers/{name}/keys/{id}`, and `PUT /api/proxy-config` are updated to document the 403 condition and the destination rules.
- E2E harness collection adds test group 138 covering the proxy-URL and Azure key-endpoint 403 cases under the default (auth-unconfigured) profile, with follow-up GET assertions confirming nothing was persisted.
- [x] Bug fix
- [x] Core (Go)
- [x] Transports (HTTP)
- [x] Docs
```sh
go test ./core/providers/utils/... ./transports/bifrost-http/handlers/...
```
Key test cases added:
- `TestIsAbsoluteRequestURL` — pins the scheme+host detection rule shared between `GetRequestPath` and the interception guard.
- `TestAuthBypassedMiddleware_MarksRequest` — confirms the bypass marker is set on every request when no config store is present.
- `TestUpdateProxyConfig_InterceptionGuardWhenAuthBypassed` — same proxy URL + timeout edit passes; new URL or `skip_tls_verify` on returns 403 and nothing is persisted.
- `TestUpdateProxyConfig_RejectsLinkLocalURL` — `169.254.169.254` and `0.0.0.0` return 400; `10.x` and `127.x` return 200.
- `TestUpdateProviderKey_EndpointGuardWhenAuthBypassed` — unchanged Ollama URL + weight edit passes; changed URL returns 403.
- `TestProviderKeyEndpointGuard_CoversEveryDialTarget` — Bedrock region-only create passes; runtime endpoint override, Databricks workspace URL, Bedrock Mantle endpoint, Copilot `github_domain`, and Azure per-alias endpoint all return 403.
- `TestProviderKeyURL_RejectsLinkLocalDestination` — link-local and unspecified key URLs return 400; private and loopback return 200.
- `TestAddProvider_RejectsBaseURLWhenAuthBypassed` / `TestAddProvider_RejectsAllowPrivateNetworkWhenAuthBypassed` — both fields individually trigger 403.
- `TestProviderInterceptionGuardWhenAuthBypassed` — proxy URL, CA certs, `insecure_skip_verify`, and absolute path overrides all return 403; path-only overrides and redacted-echo saves pass.
- `TestUpdateProvider_BaseURLGuardComparesStoredConfigWhenAuthBypassed` — unchanged base URL + concurrency edit passes; `allow_private_network` turned on returns 403 with or without a base URL.
- [x] No
Deployments with dashboard authentication properly configured are unaffected. Deployments running without authentication (the fail-open mode) will now receive 403 on attempts to set or change any dial destination, proxy, CA certificate, TLS skip, or absolute request-path override — operations that were previously silently accepted.
This change directly addresses an SSRF / credential-interception primitive: without it, any host that can reach the management API in an auth-disabled deployment could redirect provider credentials to an attacker-controlled server. The guards are conservative — they only block changes that widen the attack surface, not reads or non-destination edits — so legitimate UI usage in auth-disabled deployments (editing concurrency, models, weights, etc.) continues to work.
- [x] I read `docs/contributing/README.md` and followed the guidelines
- [x] I added/updated tests where appropriate
- [x] I updated documentation where needed
- [x] I verified builds succeed (Go and UI)
- [x] I verified the CI pipeline passes locally if applicable
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docs/contributing/README.mdand followed the guidelines